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ABSTRACT
The unassailable continuity of female genital cutting (FGC) despite its
criminalization and the salience wielded over the past few decades stokes thoughts
about what is missing—signifying the need to examine present legal mechanisms
pertinent to FGC critically. The current research fails to consider the full breadth of
the entanglement of law and culture relating to FGC, which is important because
where the change of behavior is the objective of the law, social and legal norms must
interact. By relying on the basis that FGC is not a normative crime but a deeply
rooted cultural practice, I argue that international law gravitates towards setting
standards molded by a Western framework, which is diametrically opposed to the
social norms and culture of communities practicing FGC.
This thesis utilizes a bidirectional doctrinal methodology to evaluate the
evolution, substance, limitations, and mode of integration of Western international
law by domestic states, particularly Ghana, to show how these elements contribute
to the sustenance of FGC. Due to the homogenization of legal culture due to
globalization, my research demonstrates that the insidious seeping of the Western
cultural framework causes a corresponding replicated integration and application in
domestic law. The criminalization of FGC in Ghana, similarly to other developing
countries, birthed from these Western values and standards do not coincide with the
nature of FGC. Hence, when laws are antithetical to a social group’s norms, its
powers to effectuate social change are limited. To relieve this tension caused by
legal pluralism, I explore vernacularization as a viable solution to assimilate
international law into domestic law.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The ubiquity and contentiousness surrounding the topic of Female Genital Cutting (FGC)
has caused it to make waves in a plethora of forms—ranging from the politics of who has the
ultimate right to intervene to the subsequent criminalization through international law and its
adoption by many states, including Ghana.1 Despite the waves being made, there appears to be a
limitation of the law concerning the eradication of FGC. Through the analysis of prevalence trends,
it has been proven that there has been an unsatisfactory material decline in the practice despite its
criminalization in many states.2
FGC is a procedure that has been established as an abuse of human rights by the
international community and several states. It has been characterized as such due to the physical
harm that ensues as an after-effect, such as keloid growths, blood loss, pain, infection,
complications in urinating or menstruating, and death. 3 The fatality rate of FGC is increased due
to the procedure being performed in low-income societies where there is little health care. 4 Effects
of the practice go beyond the scope of physical harm and verge into mental harm, causing
depression and other mental health issues. 5

1

Lwamwe Muzima, "Towards a Sensitive Approach to Ending Female Genital Mutilation /Cutting in Africa" (2016)
3:1 SOAS LJ 73 at 80; Shayla McGee, "Female Circumcision in Africa: Procedures, Rationales, Solutions, and the
Road to Recovery" (2005) 11 Wash & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc LJ 133 at 133. I chose the term cutting rather than
mutilation as I convey a message of sensitivity, even if the practice is wrong. I also use the term cutting instead of
mutilation because FGM is a term used to denote “horror and disgust” which instigates the insensitivity towards
communities that practice FGC. The word circumcision also does not convey the seriousness of harmful effect of the
practice. The intent behind female circumcision differs from the intent behind male circumcision.
2
Elliot Klein et al “Female Genital Mutilation: Health Consequences and Complications—A Short Literature
Review” (2018) Hindawi Obstetrics and Gynecology International 1 at 3. doi: 10.1155/2018/7365715
3
Maureen Mswela, "Female Genital Mutilation: Medico-Legal Issues" (2010) 29:4 Med & L 523 at 524.
4
Klein et al, supra note 2 at 4.
5
Theodora A Christou & Sam Fowles, "Failure to Protect Girls from Female Genital Mutilation" (2015) 79:5 J Crim
L 344 at 346.
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FGC involves removing the clitoral prepuce or removing the clitoris and all or part of the
labia minora.6 Infibulation has the most adverse effects due to the severity of the process involving
removing the clitoris, the whole of the labia minora, and usually ends up in the removal of the
medial part of the labia majora. 7 The two ends of the vulva are sewn together with silk, and a
small piece of wood is inserted to maintain an opening for urine and menstrual blood.8 These
procedures reduce the quality of life of the girls it is performed on, and hence, due to the extreme
nature of infibulation, surgical corrections, labeled as deinfibulation are occasionally performed to
support childbirth and sexual intercourse. 9
The unsterilized and unwashed knives used during most procedures, without the use of
anesthesia coupled with the lack of any medical qualification of the circumcisers, intensifies the
worry of the public and the international community.10 Another aspect of the practice that gives
rise to intense criticism is the lack of capacity to consent to the procedure.11 FGC is mainly carried
out on girls between infancy and the age of 15, below the age of capacity to act in many countries.12
WHO presents staggering FGC figures showing that over 200 million girls and women
have undergone the procedure.13

Projecting into the future, 3 million girls are at risk for

circumcision in Africa, with 85% of them experiencing medical complications at some point in

6

Joseph Adesoji Oluyemi, Joseph Adijaat Adejoke & Deborah Adekeye, "Female Genital Mutilation and Girl-Child
Dilemma: The Nigeria Experience" (2019) 2019:2 Rev Universitara Sociologie 10 at 11.
7
Ibid.
8
Hope Lewis, "Between Irua and Female Genital Mutilation: Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural
Divide" (1995) 8 Harv Hum Rts J 1 at 5; Ibid.
9
Babasola O. Okusanya et al “Deinfibulation for preventing or treating complications in women living with type III
female genital mutilation: A systematic review and meta- analysis” (2017) 2017:136 Int J Gynecol Obstet 13 at 14.
10
Mswela, supra note 3 at 524; Oluyemi et al supra note 6 at 14.
11
“Female Genital Mutilation” (3 February 2020) online: World Health Organization https://www.who.int/newsroom/fact-sheets/detail/female-genital-mutilation
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
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their lives. 14 Although a higher percentage of these figures arise from developing countries in
Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, this issue is not exclusive to these developing countries and has
wielded attention due to people practicing it in Western countries. 15 Hence, due to it being a
worldwide concern, combined with the homogenization of legal culture, international law poses
solutions to eradicate FGC. These solutions revolve around criminalization and its associated
normative mode of enforcement.
While many studies focus on the limitations of law (both international and domestic) and
the need for education and other measures, the full breadth of the relationship between law and
culture has not been explored to consider FGC. The discussions across decades about FGC related
to culture have resulted in a paralysis of analysis and deadlocks between different schools of
thought.16
The principal question this thesis seeks to answer is: how does the substance and mode of
integration and implementation of international law by domestic states, particularly Ghana, sustain
the continuance of FGC despite its illegality? Considering this question, I explore the limitations
of criminalization and the normative mode of enforcement advanced by international law. To
understand the limitations of international law, I examine the substance of international law and
its criminalizing standard. I do this by investigating its history as a method advanced by Third
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). I also argue that western frameworks do not
consider the depth and nature of FGC, and therefore advance normative criminal standards that do

14

Klein et al, supra note 2 at 3.
McGee, supra note 1 at 133. Female Genital Mutilation occurs in regions in east, west and central Africa. In
countries such as Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, where the best predictor of circumcision is ethnicity or cultural
groups, there are relatively lower rates at 50%, 43% and 30%, respectively. FGC also occurs in Indonesia, Malaysia,
India, Pakistan, South Yemen.
16
Eva Brems, "Enemies or Allies - Feminism and Cultural Relativism as Dissident Voices in Human Rights
Discourse" (1997) 19:1 Hum Rts Q 136 at 144.
15
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not have a positive correlating effect. I also explore how these western criminal standards are
embedded in Ghana’s domestic law and do not positively correlate to curbing FGC.
Research Questions
Born of the gap between the current legal and social fabric and the ideal state of affairs are the
questions:
1. How does the substance and mode of integration and implementation of international law
by domestic states, particularly Ghana, sustain the continuance of FGC despite its
illegality?
2. How can law attempt to change the social and cultural fabric which perpetuates FGC in
northern Ghana?
Significance of the Research
I experienced the inefficient management of policies first-hand in Ghana. Distinctly not an
abstract concept but reality, it stirred a plethora of questions and curiosity of issues pertinent to
women's rights, which has birthed this thesis. As noted in the introduction, there are three (3),
million girls, at risk for circumcision in Africa, with 85% of them experiencing medical
complications at some point in their lives. The significance of this research is to constitute a
foundation to prompt tailoring of the law to suit social norms and practices within communities
that practice FGC to end the practice. This research also seeks to bridge the divergent theories of
universalism and cultural relativism through vernacularization. Vernacularization is “the process
of appropriation and local adoption of globally generated ideas and strategies.” 17 I advance the

Sally Engle Merry and Peggy Levitt “The Vernacularization of Women’s Rights” in Human Rights Futures
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 213; Also, in Sally Engle Merry and Peggy Levitt
“Vernacularization on the Ground: Local Uses of Global Women’s Rights in Peru, China, India and the United States”
17
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process of vernacularization as international law and culture both have positive and significant
aspects that shape the day-to-day lives of persons practicing FGC.
Thesis Structure
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is an introduction to the subject matter
and research questions. Chapter one also presents a review of the literature. The first section of the
literature review discusses the power culture wields to understand the basis of FGC. This section
examines the need to understand the perspective of communities that practice FGC without a
condemnatory lens. Based on the cultural schism that exists due to culture, the second section
discusses universalism and cultural relativism. The final section of chapter one explains
vernacularization as legal practices adapted to fit local practices, as this constitutes my proposed
solution in Chapter five.
Chapter two provides the methods and legal tools I will use to conduct the thesis. The
second section of chapter two discusses the theoretical framework I will use to support the thesis.
The first theory, the deterrence theory, and theories of law and society show the limits of deterrence
in curbing FGC when certain social factors arise. The second section on feminist legal theory,
based on the concept of differences between societies, goes into more detail about the differences
between human beings and the need to consider intersectionality. Finally, (TWAIL) is discussed
as a basis to delve into the history and substance of international law in chapter three.
In Chapter three, I utilize a TWAIL approach, focusing on the history and substance of
international law, which represents an imposed European legal culture opposed to cultures
practicing FGC. The first section traces the European nature of international law to show how it

Global Networks 9: 4 (2009), 441 at 447. Their work, in exploring the tensions between international and national
rights ideas, focuses on conundrums in the mode of appropriation, usage and dissemination of human rights.

5

developed from Roman antiquity. The second section shows how shared values emanated through
civilization. This final section takes the reader through present-day international law and how
international law gravitates towards criminalization as the unrivaled legal measure based on the
foundation of European law.
Chapter four shows how due to colonization and the need to homogenize the legal culture
of the world, domestic law, rather than integrating international law according to the culture of
Ghana, has duplicated international and European law and legal culture.
Finally, in chapter five, I conduct a brief interpretation of the constitution to determine if
vernacularization through incorporating customary norms is a workable option in eradicating FGC.
Literature Review
Female Genital Cutting and the Conundrum of Culture
Renteln insightfully points out the dissimilar nature of culture, stating: “culture is so
powerful in the way it shapes individuals’ perceptions that understanding the way of life in other
societies depends on gaining insight into what might be called the inner cultural logic.” 18 Muzima
also labels this “inner cultural logic” as a “synoptic account of the inside point of view.” 19 The
compendium of literature on FGC may plausibly be described as the embodiment of how those of
a particular culture may not understand a different community’s beliefs. 20 Due to the grim nature
of the custom, communities that practice FGC have been characterized as “primitive” and

18

Renteln, Alison Dundes. "Relativism and the Search for Human Rights." (1988) 90:1 American Anthropologist 56
at 57.
19
Muzima, supra note 1 at 75.
20
Vanessa Ortiz, "Culture Shock: Expanding the Current Federal Law against Female Genital Circumcision " (2008)
3:2 FIU L Rev 423. In the title, Ortiz aptly characterizes the experience of those who are from different cultures trying
to understand FGC as “culture shock”; Sussman, "Contending with Culture: An Analysis of the Female Genital
Circumcision Act of 1996" (1998) 31:1 Cornell Int'l LJ 193 at 208.

6

“barbaric.”21 The other half of the academic debate argues, similarly to Renteln, that this
condemnatory lens stems from having little to no understanding of the reasoning and motives of
those who practice it.22
Engaging in a quest to grasp the social and cultural fabric of communities in northern
Ghana is what emanates from the research by Sakeah et al.23 The authors seek to answer what
seems to be the inexplicable question of why up to 61% of women are still undergoing FGC despite
its pronounced illegality. 24 In utilizing grounded theory, qualitative design data was gathered from
18 face-to-face in-depth discussions and 12 focus group discussions, including circumcised
women. 25

According to the authors’ findings, the entire practice circles around historical

traditions, coupled with the moral high ground that girls must uphold to be good enough for men. 26
It is believed that as sex will be painful and undesirable, they will have no desire to “break their
virginity.”27 Beyond that, even in marriage, it is believed that the clitoris can make a woman
demand uncontrollable sexual desires the husband cannot satisfy, causing her to engage in extra-

21

Nancy Ehrenreich & Mark Barr, "Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and the Selective Condemnation of
Cultural Practices" (2005) 40:1 Harv CR-CL L Rev 71 at 71. The practice has been presented as primitive and wildly
unreasonable, despite the cultural underpinning; Muzima, supra note 1 at 75. Muzima argues that the world becoming
a global village and the awareness of different cultures “may lead to the inevitable tendency to make ethnocentric
value judgments;” See also "What's Culture Got to Do with It - Excising the Harmful Tradition of Female
Circumcision " (1993) 106:8 Harv L Rev 1944 at 1944. The harmful nature of FGC is usually brought to light through
a storytelling lens; hence, the average person can grasp the wounding and unfavourable characteristics of the practice.
22
Megan Fotheringham, "Culture Clashes: Balancing Local and International Interests in Ending Female Genital
Cutting Practices" (2004) 16:2 LBJ J Pub Aff 72 at 78.
23
Evelyn, Sakeah et al, “Persistent female genital Mutilation despite its illegality: Narratives from women and men
in northern Ghana.” (2019) 14:4 PLos One 1 at at 1. Although 4% of women who have been circumcised live in
Ghana, there is a high concentration of these numbers in the northern part of Ghana. Bawku and Pusiga are two
districts with a very high prevalence of FGC, which is 61%.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid at 4. Also included are traditional leaders, elders, women leaders, community volunteers, fathers, mothers,
assembly men, and men and women of productive age. The value interviews from the lived experiences of these
people cannot be understated. It reputes assumptions and gives out their truth, from different perspectives of men and
women, old and young.
26
What’s Culture Got to Do with it? supra note 21 at 1 and 9; Vivian Chukwudumebi Madu, "Socio-Cultural Practices
Harmful on Female Reproductive Health: A Case against Female Genital Circumcision" (2020) 100 JL Pol'y &
Globalization 72 at 73.
27
Ibid.
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marital affairs.28 This finding expands on Ortiz’s postulation that the role of FGC is to ensure the
safeguarding of virginity and is used as a metric for decency. 29 To people from Pusiga and Bawku,
virginity is perceived as the symbolic gateway to the role of being a wife and mother. 30 The
implied sole purpose of a girl is marriage and the servitude associated with being married.31 Owing
to the significance of the practice to these communities, rite of passage ceremonies are occasionally
held to mark the important stage of transitioning to womanhood.32
A considerable percentage of the literature that speaks to the role of culture also notes its
inextricable linkage to history.33 To the people in northern Ghana, as many scholars assert, history
is essential. During a focus group in Bawku, a man highlights the historical value of FGC, noting,
“the practice started a very long time ago.”34 The literature demonstrates the practice stretching
far back before migration into Ghana, grasping how deep the procedure runs as there were imports
from Togo and Burkina Faso. Some of the participants even believe it started from Adam and
Eve.35 Similarly, when explaining the reason for the practice, a woman in Pusiga stated. “…it was
handed over to us from our forefathers so we will also hand it over to the next generation.”36
The findings by Sakeah et al show that even though culture is primarily referred to as a
reason for FGC, this runs parallel to the refusal of the people to disengage with this cultural

28

Ibid.
What’s Culture Got to Do with it? supra note 21 at 1951-1952; Muzima, supra note 1 at 82; Abdulmumini A Oba,
"Female Circumcision as Female Genital Mutilation: Human Rights or Cultural Imperialism" (2008) 8:3 Global Jurist
[i] at 5.
30
Camilla Yusuf & Tonatan Fessha, "Female Genital Mutilation as a Human Rights Issue: Examining the
Effectiveness of the Law against Female Genital Mutilation in Tanzania" (2013) 13:2 Afr Hum Rts LJ 356 at 360;
Mswela, supra note 3 at 528.
31
Ibid. The implied sole purpose of a girl is marriage and the servitude associated with being married.
32
Ibid.
33
Fotheringham, supra note 22 at 74; Katie Clayton-Greene, "Female Genital Cutting: A New Way Forward" (2015)
23 Waikato L Rev 168 at 174.
34
Sakeah et al, supra note 23 at 5.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid at 6; Yusuf & Fessha, supra note 30 at 359.
29
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practice. 37 Drawing from the people's reasoning, the stirring combination of culture and history is
entrenched into a sense of identity. The practice represents a personal identity, which operates
within a group identity and determines one’s status.38 Hence, culture impedes a sense of autonomy,
as identity is not only a personal conviction but is solidified through a collective stamp of
authenticity. 39 This is reflected in who is considered a ‘woman’—their individual and collective
idea is that a person does not simply become a woman but transitions into one after FGC.40
Consequently, the power culture wields is reinforced by the need to belong. 41 In some
communities, including Pusiga and Bawku, FGC represents social acceptance and integration. 42
Sussman observes that the ability to associate oneself with other members of a particular tribe and
be identified as a member of that group with a claim to its social advantages is of paramount
importance to many communities. Sussman’s observation reflects the social fabric of the people
in northern Ghana.43 The influence of culture on the people extends beyond the practice itself—it
is socially binding.

What’s Culture Got to Do with it? supra note 21 at 1949. Tradition has been described as “the reluctance to break
with age-old practices that symbolize the shared heritage of a particular ethnic group”; Muzima, supra note 1 at 82.
For many, their reason is “the continuation of their tradition.” Ortiz, supra note 20 at 431. Culture is ultimately the
reason cited for the continuance of the practice; See also Yusuf & Fessha, supra note 30 at 356.
38
Sussman, supra note 20 at 209. This practice forms an identity like those of their ancestors and others in the
community.
39
Solomon Masho Atomsa & MVR Raju, "Female Genital Mutilation in Ethiopia: Health and Human Right Issue"
(2014) 30 JL Pol'y & Globalization 97 at 103. There is hardly a choice, but an interviewee noted that even if there was
a choice, “how can one be different from the mass?” She states that the pain from FGC is better than not being selected
for marriage; Mswela supra note 3 at 527. The very young adolescent girls subjected to the practice are hardly "free"
to make an objective decision in this regard.”
40
Sussman, supra note 20 at 209; Clayton-Greene supra note 33 at 175.
41
Muzima, supra note 1 at 83. Although all roads lead to patriarchy and there is little doubt, in my opinion, that FGC
is but one of the many manifestations of a system of male privilege, it still gives them a sense of belonging to them.
42
What has culture got to do with it, supra note 21 at 1949-1950. In Akwa Ibom [State] and in villages in the Calabar
area of Cross River State, uncircumcised women face disgrace when they quarrel with circumcised women, who
outnumber them. A woman will make a particular clicking sound with her tongue during a disagreement, implying
that the woman she is arguing with is uncircumcised; Muzima, supra note 1 at 75-77 and 82. They regard it as
mandatory for reasons defined by their society and do not see themselves as “victims.”
43
What has culture got to do with it? supra note 21 at 1949; Yusuf & Fessha, supra note 30 at 359.
37
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As there is no room for dissent in these communities, an uncircumcised girl is ridiculed by
her peers.44

The effects of not being circumcised also affect the entire family. In some

communities, the father of an uncircumcised girl is not permitted to speak at community meetings,
and the mother is ridiculed. 45 The social price of not being circumcised is, as Fotheringham
describes, costly. 46
Many scholars such as Atomsa, Masho, and Raju put forward the tenable argument that
despite the sway it holds, culture cannot be a defense against human rights violations.47 This is in
response to the inescapable question: Is female genital circumcision crime or culture?” 48 Muzima,
in agreement, notes that though it is unfair to criticize what has been entrenched as their normalcy,
the legitimacy of a custom or cultural practice must be hinged on the promotion and protection of
universal human rights.49 Ultimately, in the case of culture versus human rights, human rights
should irrefutably be the winning party as FGC should not be the price to pay for belonging.
Although it is a stark fact that the practice of FGC is harmful, the essence of the contentious
issue of culture is how FGC is addressed. Many assertions made by the media and western
literature reflect a skewed vilifying lens that has been widely labeled as “insensitive” and
“imperialistic.”50 This characterization feeds into the rhetoric of most developing countries being

44

Bettina Shell-Duncan et al, "Legislating Change: Responses to Criminalizing Female Genital Cutting in Senegal"
(2013) 47:4 Law & Soc'y Rev 803 at 817. Uncircumcised girls are labelled “solema” which is “rude, ignorant,
immature, uncivilized and unclean.”
45
Sussman supra note 20 at 211-12.
46
Fotheringham supra note 22 at 79.
47
Oba supra note 29 at 2; Masho Atomsa & Raju supra note 39 at 98.
48
Shell-Duncan, supra note 44 at 805.
49
Muzima, supra note 1 at 76-77 and 82-83. Also, they believe it has a positive effect, which is beauty. Shwedar
warns that the West should not see their perception of beauty as universal and impose that standard. They do it as a
symbol of love for their daughters and their intent is pure; What’s culture got to do with it page supra note 21 at 1946
and 1957-1959.
50
Oba supra note 29 at 26.
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barbaric and uncivilized, implicitly categorizing those from these communities as “others.” 51
Fotheringham describes the international community’s involvement as a “double-edged sword,”
as it has been both a “blessing and a curse.” 52
According to Ehrenreich and Barr, this insensitive tone amounts to “reductionism” as FGC
is used as a term indicative of “African” “culture.”53 It is further argued that this characterization
dismisses the different meanings attached to FGC by those who practice it and assumes that
African culture is nothing more than FGC.54 Sussman argues that no matter how harmful a cultural
practice is, that is not a justifiable ground to refute the validity of arguments calling for cultural
sensitivity. 55
Engle classifies legal scholars exploring the topic of FGC as “doctrinalists,” criticizing
their non-engagement in trying to understand the “traditionalist female.” 56 Sussman similarly
states that it is necessary to assess the basis of cultural arguments, and not doing so is an imperialist
attempt to save these “barbaric” people from their “peculiar” ways. 57 Coleman, who typifies this
concept of saving the “barbaric” people, has been criticized for asserting that FGC interferes with

51

Obiajulu Nnamuchi, "Harm or Benefit - Hate or Affection - Is Parental Consent to Female Genital Ritual Ever
Defensible" (2013) 8:3 J Health & Biomedical L 377 at 440. Nnamuchi describes the meaningful nature of this
characterization, stating, “Remaining resolute in the face of failed "we" (civilized) and "them" (primitive) sociocultural
dynamics is counterproductive.”; Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko, "Rethinking Human Rights and Culture through
Female Genital Surgeries" (2015) 37:1 Waikato L. Hum Rts Q 107 at 109; Ibid. Oba asserts that The West is quick to
condemn practices in other cultures that it considers unacceptable; Ehrenreich & Barr, supra note 21 at 76;
Fotheringham, supra note 22 at 72; Clayton-Greene supra note 33 at 23. This labelling of people who are different as
others has been described as hegemonizing and racializing. Also, the “barbaric” imagery attached to communities that
practice FGC was further exacerbated by sensationalizing media such as the CNN footage of an Egyptian girl being
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the “Americanization” of immigrant girls. 58 Seemingly, ethnocentric efforts to halt FGC, which
diminish the “intelligence and cultural integrity” of practicing communities, will trigger an
opposition to change as these bona fide intentions are merged with misguided support.59
Explicit insensitivity has been criticized within feminist legal theory as essentialist. As the
interests of white women and women of colour differ, this has caused a sharp divide between
them.60 The essentialist point of view stems from the essentialist women not understanding or
even attempting to understand the struggle those from different cultures face in grappling with the
cultural underpinnings of FGC.61 Due to this dichotomy, Black and African feminists have taken
a detour from the conventional path of universalism as they believe that Western women do not
consider these communities' worth, culture, and socio-economic context and have concluded that
FGC is a barbaric practice. Many third-world women deem the issue of FGC as one deserving
sensitive attention.62 The essentialist point of view reflects a heterosexual, white, middle-class
point of view and is usually particularly insensitive.63
The legal, institutional design that tackles FGC has been brought to the forefront of the
cultural discourse. The Female Genital Mutilation Act in the United States reintroduced two
difficult questions in international law. (i) how can “outsiders” work to put an end to a deeply
entrenched practice such as FGC? (ii) what role should law play in eradicating the practice of
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FGC?64 The international community has promoted legislation as an important tool for the
eradication of FGC. However, the legitimacy of legislative mechanisms—both internationally and
domestically—has been questioned as the practice still ensues. 65

While some believe in

criminalization’s deterring effects, others also argue that it can be regarded as “coercive,” fruitless,
and counterproductive, raising the debate of cultural relativism and universalism. 66
Scholars considering the continuance of FGC have debated the purpose and effect of the
law. Although the law can effectively eliminate a social practice, according to Mezey, it can also
inadvertently work contrary to its objectives. 67 Yussuf and Fessha argue that criminalization
pushes it underground when the law does not develop measures for social change. 68 Shell-Duncan,
similarly to Oba, highlights the adverse effects of criminalization as fines and imprisonment of the
mothers may prove futile.69 Muzima proposes a solution to the problem identified by ShellDuncan and Oba, suggesting that criminalization should be abandoned, as the intent of these
mothers is not mala fide, but they are, in fact, victims. 70
Although these scholars delve into the purpose and shortfalls of the legal system, and
advance solutions, they fail to account for the full breadth of the entanglement of law and
conflicting cultures.71 The roots of law can usually be found in the culture or social fabric of the
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geographical area from which it emanates. 72 Likewise, the law reflects a particular way of life or
culture which molds the people.73 For example, the law can aim to promote or prevent a system
based on queer culture.74 When laws are antithetical to the norms of a social group, Shell-Duncan
posits that it has limited powers. 75 This thesis argues that the prevailing legal culture is opposed
to the conceptions of those in northern Ghana, rendering it ineffective.
The prevailing culture described earlier in the international community is characterized by
insensitivity and reductionism. Hence, subsequently, this legal culture is translated into
international law. This international legal system can be said to be mirrored in universalism, which
Muzima describes as culture.76 According to Magtogo, the law should be sensitive and give regard
to cultural relativism principles and the pluralistic underpinnings of these communities.
The following section will focus on two clashing theoretical tenets, universalism, and
cultural relativism, that influence legal culture and fuel the chasm between these tenets.
The Rise of Universalism and the Stagnancy of Cultural Relativism
Based on the literature, there appears to be a spectrum of antithetical ideologies that
constitute justifying frameworks for implementing human rights interventions where researchers
are positioned. At one end of the spectrum is the radical universalist, and at the other is the absolute
cultural relativist standpoint. With the stumbling block of international legal mechanisms not fully
merging fluidly into the culturally pluralistic legal systems of countries practicing FGC, and
despite these extreme ideologies, this question begs to ask: Can cultural differences qualify
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universality, or is it an unqualified structural ideology? Conversely, can a society's cultural
framework be deemed an absolute mechanism for assessing human rights abuses without
considering exogenous factors? The answers to these questions are fundamental to the issue of
FGC, which Harris-Short posits as a ‘classic example of the conflict between universalism and
cultural relativism. 77
Many scholars have delved into possible answers for these uncompromising ideologies,
which have unfortunate latent effects for people in the crosshairs of human rights abuses if
misapplied. Kajit describes cultural relativism as “the notion that a practice, value, norm and law
of a society should be understood and appraised by people outside of that society ‘only’ in that
society’s terms and standards.”78 Criticism revolving around cultural relativism likewise seems to
suggest that the restricted bounds that hinge on terms such as only, as reflected in Kajit’s definition,
offer a one choice solution: Cultural relativism is the only lens or conduit through which opinions,
terms, standards, or solutions relevant to FGC should emanate as the validity of human rights
depends “entirely” on culture.79 This further instigates the chasm between cultural relativists and
universalists on the extreme ends of the spectrum.
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Fueling the disapproval of cultural relativism is the prevalence of human rights abuses in
nations and communities that assert the need for cultural relativism. 80 In particular, developing
countries have a history and a reputation for the concentration of human rights abuses, including
FGC. 81 This reputation, along with the claim by some cultural relativists that “rights violations in
one culture may be viewed as morally just in another culture,” 82 lead many to believe and assert
that cultural relativism is exploited as a ‘smoke screen’ to advance human rights abuses in these
countries83 deemed to be politically corrupt cesspools. This has caused Bagu to label cultural
relativism as an “ideological refuge,”84 as this is the reflection it exudes based on reading between
the lines of the current human rights status and the non-meddling core of cultural relativism.
On the other side of the ideological table, the stance of universalists differs across the board
similarly to cultural relativists, with some researchers holding milder viewpoints and others with
vehemently antagonistic perspectives. 85 Otiz labels those at the far-reaching universalist end of the
spectrum as “hard universalists.”86 The assertion of hard universalists stems from the belief that
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the universal code is “unalterable.”87 Ultimately, these assertions, similarly to the exclusive terms
such as ‘only’ utilized by cultural relativists, operate as a vehicle of qualification of human rights,
causing an absolute exclusion of cultural relativism.
According to Leons, the unresolved nature of the debate between universalism and cultural
relativism is because “neither side is willing to grant the other its central assumption.” 88 This
presumption aligns with the limiting terms used by advocates of both theories, which excludes any
other approach that deviates from the premise being advanced.
Despite the army of scholars behind each theory and how rife each stance is with criticisms,
proponents of the universalist end of the spectrum are deemed to possess a stamp of popularity
where it matters most.89

This popularity is reflected in the manifestations of universalism

practically in conventions and agreements implemented worldwide. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights title grants this legitimacy to universalism through the word “universal” in the title
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. 90 Bajit, grappling with the merits and demerits
of each ideology, asserts that “the universalist ideology has, however, enjoyed greater favour, and
would seem a step short of an absolute cry.”91 Likewise, Sibian explains the criticism faced by
the universalist standpoint, albeit prefaced by acknowledging the momentum it has gained
worldwide.92
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According to cultural relativists, this popularity is deemed to exist with universalism
because of the stratified nature of Western culture and politics in comparison to the outliers, which
includes countries with ardent cultural relativists. Nonetheless, culture, which has been established
as the plausible originator of FGC, is hoisted with a broad inference that universalists are
‘Westerners’ and relativists are from developing countries when universalism and cultural
relativism are discussed, evident through the nomenclature of these ideologies. 93 In speaking to
the nature of these ideologies, Ghai describes culture as a linkage and intertwining of history,
language, religion, values, cuisine, and the way people generally live.94 This indicates the
‘universality of culture; it is not idiosyncratic but applies to all communities and countries,
including Western countries. In this vein, Ghai also states, “the current debate is essentially
between states advancing different views of culture for reasons only tangentially connected with
culture.”95 Ghai’s postulation throws out the notion that culture is typical of only developing
countries and implicitly puts forward the tenable angle that universalism is based on Western
culture.
Hence, in other words, there are two standpoints—individually launched on the back of
culture—though the one with the stamp of popularity is granted the universal title. The other
cultural standpoint is sidelined and excluded due to countries executing it having less bargaining
power. Ultimately, the assertion by hard universalists is that culture cannot be a determining factor
in establishing international human rights law. However, this is a contradictory assertion by Ghai’s
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postulation as universalism advances culture, albeit predominantly the culture of the West, which
is imposed as the standard for the eradication of FGC.
Hence, criticism has been launched because of this Western culture in which Bagu states:
“To extend this particular ideology to the rest of the world is thus logically faulty at best and
maliciously imperial at worst.”96 Critics of the UDHR also state, “Ascribing a ‘legal face’ to what
is primarily a particular culture and further declaring it universal, they contend, is logically
dubious, ideologically imperialistic and positively subversive of the nature of law….”97 By the
same token, Bagu’s assertion rests on the opinion that universalism “merely reflects a particular
ethnocentric perspective, and, in this case, the Euro-American perspective,” which reflects values
foreign to non-Western cultures. 98 These assertions of ethnocentrism embed the West in the scope
of culture and depict an actualization of cultural superiority, possibly bolstered by the political
power wielded by the West.
Globalization, which is not only present in free-market principles but evident in the scope
of human rights,99 is inferred by scholars as the catalyst for the need to homogenize the legal
culture of states.100 This globalization is viewed as the factor causing domination and adoption of
Western culture, as Western countries leverage the power they possess to cause a shift in the legal
culture of ‘weaker’ states. Katto notes this shift in legal systems due to globalization, stating, “the

96

Bagu, supra note 78 at 4.
Nayak, supra note 54 at 86, Nayak emphasizes how this reflects the values of a “select few.”
98
Ibid. Bagu, supra note 78 at 6. There is an assertion that although Western culture is imposed through universalism,
Western culture also condones practices which contradict universal values; Lewis, supra note 8 at 19.
99
Alex Y Seita, "Globalization and the Convergence of Values" (1997) 30:2 Cornell Intl U 429 at 429 and 438. The
development of the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT were significant moments in
globalization.
100
James D Wilets, "Unified Theory of International Law, the State, and the Individual: Transnational Legal
Harmonization in the Context of Economic and Legal Globalization" (2010) 31:3 U Pa J Int'l L 753-755. Wilets coins
the term ‘Transnational Legal Harmonization’ to describe this process of non-state actors wielding power in the
emanation of legal norms that are globalized.
97

19

pressures towards a convergence of legal culture brought on by globalization have seen an
encouragement in the movement of legal regimes.” 101
Globalization is a concept with various definitions that signify how systems and ideas cut
across international arenas. 102 However, McCorquodale and Fairbrother regard globalization as a
rather contradictory concept, as described by this definition by Robertson: “we may best consider
contemporary globalization in its most general sense as a form of institutionalization of the twofold process involving the universalization of particularism and the particularization of
universalism.”103 Kinley concurs with this particularism being globalized, stating that what is
universalized now began as a local concept.104 Merry asserts that anthropologists have steered
clear of human rights movements because “human rights are historically an artifact of Western
cultural traditions raised to the status of global normativity.” 105 Mazrui goes to the extent of
positing homogenization, as well as hegemonization as a consequence of globalization. 106 This
concept of universalizing particularism is evident in universalists’ assertion that fundamental
human rights must apply across all borders and cultures to have significant influence and effect.107
The concept of rights universalists have, is immediately deemed to carry peremptory weight, which
means that this particularism ‘must’ be applied universally. Cultural relativists claim that

101

Katto, supra note 95 at 82.
Mojisola Eseyin, "Women's Rights' Protection: Globalization or Localization" (2011) 2:1 Intl J of Advanced Leg
Studies & Governance 126 at. 128.
103
Robert McCorquodale & Richard Fairbrother, "Globalization and Human Rights" (1999) 21:3 Hum Rts Q 735 at
736.
104
David Kinley, "Human Rights, Globalization and the Rule of Law: Friends, Foes or Family" (2002) 7:2 UCLA J
Int'l L & Foreign Aff 239 at 243.
105
Sally Engle Merry, "Legal Vernacularization and Ka Ho'okolokolonui Kanaka Maoli, The People's International
Tribunal, Hawai'i 1993" (1996) 19:1 Polar 67 at 67.
106
Ibid. Merry asserts, “As anthropologists, must we abandon cultural relativism and embrace the Western imperialism
masquerading as universalism inherent in human rights discourse?”; Ali Mazrui “Pretender to Universalism: Western
Culture in a Globalising Age” (2001) Global Dialogue; Nicosia 3:1 at 13.”
107
Lewis, supra note 8 at 19.
102

20

globalization, formed through these rights ideas, is a “mere reflection of the actors' flow of thought
and activities.”108—these actors being Western countries.
In this regard, it is commonplace for developing countries to embody Western rights ideas
by molding their legal system to fit the Western framework.109 As delved into by scholars, the
reason for this can be encapsulated in the term ‘bargaining power.’ In answering this question,
Benda Beckmann speaks of how financial support is granted based on the acceptance of conditions,
usually the ‘acceptance and implementation of human rights. 110 Universal rights become universal
through being assimilated in countries without bargaining power. Wilets confirms this method of
transnational legal harmonization occurring through the release of aid or trade benefits only if
certain conditions are agreed to by states without bargaining power, which include human rights
conditions. 111
Fotheringham observes that legislators have admitted that the FGC law was passed for
the sole purpose of pacifying Western demands and also because of the United States offering
foreign aid on the condition that anti-FGC policies are put in place. 112 Economic institutions such
as the International Monetary Fund insisting on these conditions are heavily influenced by the
West as their actions are controlled by their shareholders and chief members, including the USA
government and citizens.113 The World Bank's conditionality practice often goes beyond

108

Mojisola, supra note 77 at 128.
Seita, supra note 99 at 465.
110
Bagu supra note 78 at 6. Also, rights have often been used as a political tool to gain Western approval, meaning
countries seeking to further their economic standing with the West often change their laws surrounding human rights;
Mary C Tsai, "Globalization and Conditionality: Two Sides of the Sovereignty Coin" (2000) 31:4 Law & Pol'y Int'l
Bus 1317 at 1312.
111
Wilets. supra note 100 at 800.
112
Fotheringham, supra note 22 at 77.
113
Devran Unlu, "Is Conditionality for Loans from International Financial Institutions a Legitimate Way to Influence
National Policies" (2013) 6:2 Ankara B Rev 187 at 191; McCorquodale & Fairbrother, supra note 103 at 752. It cannot
be denied that these conditions which are meant to be bona fide usually do not have a positive impact. An example is
major donor states halting investments in Malawi in 1992 until President Banda sorted out the gross human rights
109

21

macroeconomic corrections prescribed by the IMF as its lending has evolved to include and
require detailed reforms affecting the public administration of states, which affects governance
issues. 114 Restrictions are then placed on the credit of states that do not comply with these
requirements. Credit is only released upon the performance of criteria outlined in the credit
agreement.”115
This reasserts the position by cultural relativists and scholars that the West controls the
shift of the legal culture of developing countries. According to Risse and Sikkink, this assimilation
is not an abrupt process but occurs in stages and involves coercion and persuasion.116 There is the
concession that even though economic globalization and these ‘bona fide’ contingencies create
order by advancing human rights and the rule of law, the opposite can be bred instead. 117
Consequently, though it is asserted that globalization “is a table where values converge,”118
not everyone at the table has the same bargaining power, rendering the “negotiations
meaningless,”119 and this gives rise to globalization ripening into universalism. This partially
explains the arc of human rights turning towards universalism as opposed to cultural relativism. 120
This shift materializes the worry cultural relativists expressed that the human rights system
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cultivated by the United Nations would be used as a tool to force Western cultural values on
societies. 121
However, setting extremities and disparate collisions aside, there are moderate cultural
relativists and universalists found in varying degrees in the middle of this universalism and cultural
relativism spectrum, which I refer to as middle-grounders. Nayak, quoting Coomaraswami puts
forward the question, “how can human rights be authorized in radically different societies without
succumbing either to homogenizing universalism or the paralysis of cultural relativism?” 122 which
appears to be the question middle-grounders seek to answer by finding some balance.
Ultimately, these middle grounders attempt to bridge these clashing theoretical tenets on
the premise of an actual working theory. 123 “However, it should be noted that not all cultural
relativists reject outright the entire concept of human rights; rather, many cultural relativists reject
specific human rights claims or the specific context and interpretation of a rights claim.” 124 They
believe that “all people share some common morals,” as advanced by soft universalists.125 A
recognized cultural relativist view is that, as a foundation, “some human rights standards are
universal and must be respected by all.” 126 However, middle grounders go beyond this foundation
and insist on the inclusion of cultural relativism to some extent. 127 Donnelly argues that “it may
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be necessary to allow limited cultural variations in the form and interpretation of particular human
rights, but we must insist on their fundamental moral universality.” 128
In the literature, discussions about these theories and discourses are eminently hinged on
either the aberrant and gruesome nature of FGC, the dichotomy between ideological facets in
international spheres, or how a middle ground should be reached. 129 “Admittedly, difficulties
abound in determining where the lines of universality should be drawn.” 130
As some middle grounders describe cultural relativism as “tolerance for difference,” 131 the
next section extends the responsibility of tolerating difference from an international responsibility
to state responsibility through the concept of vernacularization.
Vernacularization at the Crossroad of Pluralism?
Owing to legal pluralism, people live at the crossroads of their cultural group, national
values, and global standards. Hence, the viewpoint of many incorporates local and global values. 132
In this regard, many layers of law operate on each level—international, national, and customary
law, which “exist in parallel regimes.” 133 Legal systems incorporating international law are
automatically pluralistic because they “contain and interact with a multitude of coexisting,
competing and overlapping legal systems at many levels.” 134
According to Clayton-Greene, and the discussion on the homogenization of legal culture
in the previous section, cultural values from international law are imposed. 135 As a corollary, the
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enactment of legislation explicitly outlawing FGC has been described by Fotheringham as a
consequence of external pressure. 136 Consequently, Merry observes the “fragmented,”
“inconsistent,” and “contradictory” nature of different layers of international, national, and
customary laws.137 This imposition of international cultural values further heightens the tension
caused by legal pluralism. 138

This reinforces Gunning's argument that “at this stage of a

multicultural evolution of shared values, national laws are likely to be ineffective.” 139
In discussing the power that law commands, Mezey submits that the law is coercive and
can “order and reorder” meanings. 140 Other scholars, such as Shell-Duncan and Mswela posit that,
through this power that law commands, its intended purpose is to “catalyze social change” as it
can influence thinking. 141 However, Ehrlich and supporters of his theory direct attention to the
limitations of the power of the law in influencing social change, asserting that societal norms and
customs are so pervasive that they can be more influential than the law. Hence, the law cannot
exist in isolation from societal norms and customs.142 Gunnings lends credence to this theory by
highlighting the unsuccessful use of domestic law to eradicate FGC to show that externally
imposed laws may cause problems in reducing the occurrence of the practice.143 This speaks to
the importance of the different layers of international and state laws sticking close to the people's
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norms at the local level, rather than straying far from them, losing their power to cause social
change and influence collective thinking.
Although these significant hurdles exist in the impact of the law in local spaces, critics of
the western, imperialistic, and imposing nature of human rights still emphasize the irrefutable need
for human rights.144 This need for human rights, coupled with its western legal culture that is
opposed to the people's powerful norms and customs, gives rise to a significant drawback. These
forced imposed values should be balanced with ensuring that the law against FGC is interpreted in
“cultural terms” as advocated for by Mezey. 145
For proponents of vernacularization such as Merry and Levitt, legal practices can be
adapted to fit local practices rather than implementing international law, which is considered
remote.146 The term “vernacular” emanates from the Roman term “native to a place.” 147 Merry
and Levitt describe vernacularization as “the process of appropriation and local adoption of
globally generated ideas and strategies.” 148 The need to “interpret law in cultural terms” 149 which
has been advocated for by Mezey, can be described as synonymous to vernacularization as both
terms describe the process whereby ideas, norms, and practices that are originated at a global level
are expressed to local contexts in a way that resonates with local perspectives. 150
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Rights are fundamentally between the state and its citizens. 151 Flowing from this duty,
international law prescribes obligations that bind States. This includes the obligation to protect,
which “requires States to protect individuals and groups against human rights abuses.”152 Due to
its immense importance, the state's duty in protecting citizens from human rights abuses arises in
different forms in international law, ranging from state responsibility to the responsibility to
protect.153
Culture is undoubtedly a contentious topic, and hence, a practice flowing from culture is
difficult for the formulaic confines of law to navigate. This is further intensified by the chasm
between cultural relativism and universalism, of which universalism has the upper hand.
Unfortunately, if this chasm is not resolved and is reflected in law, the issue of FGC will continue
to be a Gordian knot, mitigated by slipshod legal responses. However, the total eradication of FGC
will be an unattainable ambition. Although rights are fundamentally between states and their
citizens, 154 the research does not encompass the full scope of vernacularization. That is, focusing
on the state's capacity to be actors in ensuring that human rights approaches and laws move across
the cultural gap between international law and the communities that practice FGC. This research
seeks to answer how this culture and norm of the west and its integration in Ghana contribute to
the continuance of FGC due to the diametrically opposed nature of these social and legal cultures.

151

Ghai, supra note 79 at 1101.
United Nations, “The Foundation of International Human Rights Law” online: United Nations
<https://www.un.org/en/about-us/udhr/foundation-of-international-human-rights-law>
153
Melinda Negron-Gonzalez & Michael Contarino, "Local Norms Matter: Understanding National Responses to the
Responsibility to Protect" (2014) 20:2 Global Governance 255; Tomasz A Lewandowski, "Responsibility to Protect.
Balancing National Interests and International Obligations through Multilateralism" (2017) 3:1 ICJ 93 at 93. The
Responsibility to Protect adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005, requires States to prevent human rights
violation within their borders, focusing on atrocity crimes such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity; Rebecca J Cook, "State Responsibility for Violations of Women's Human Rights " (1994) 7 Harv
Hum Rts J 125 at pp 127-137, Cook focuses on the responsibility of states for breaches of international obligations
pertinent to women, legal protection exists in theory, but enforcement of these are weak.
154
Ghai, supra note 79 at 101.
152

27

Chapter two focuses on the contextual framework for this thesis. I outline which sources I
will use to conduct the research and to unearth the cultural conflicts present in the law, which
subsequently affects FGC. I also outline the theoretical frameworks that support the theory of this
research, which are (i) Deterrence Theory and theories of law and society (ii) Feminist legal theory
(iii) TWAIL.
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CHAPTER 2
Methodology and Theoretical Framework
Regarding the conceptual framework and research methodology employed, this thesis,
flowing from the nature of the research, primarily utilizes a bidirectional doctrinal methodology
to evaluate the substance and limitations of both international law and domestic law in Ghana.
International law considered authoritative by virtue of Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice will be reviewed in this thesis. 155 Sources include international treaties and
conventions, customary international law, and general legal principles. 156 Domestic law relevant
to this thesis is the Constitution of Ghana as the Supreme Law of the Land, the Criminal Offences
Act 1960, and case law. 157 A documentary analysis through secondary sources will be completed
to explain the relevance, application, and limitations of the laws pertaining to FGC.
As this research is substantially based on socio-legal and doctrinal analysis, a feminist legal
theory and TWAIL lens will be adopted to understand and explain the genealogy and
developments regarding FGC and international law and juxtapose these with socio-economic
developments which run parallel to FGC while exacerbating its persistence.
The following sections of this chapter focus on the theoretical frameworks that support the
theory of this thesis. The limitations of deterrence theory in curbing FGC, which rests on the
assumption that the advanced punishment will deter people from committing the crime, is
explained. The limitations of the deterrence theory are applied to posit FGC as a non-normative
crime, questioning the efficacy of the current substance and mode of enforcement of the domestic
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laws against FGC. The feminist theory, and particularly intersectionality, is also explained. Finally,
TWAIL is presented to show the limitations of international law in chapter three.
The Deterrence Theory & Theories of Law and Society
Deterrence is built on the belief of persons balancing the benefit-costs before the execution
of a crime. Hence, the rationale is that if the cost or punitive measure outweighs the benefit by a
distant stretch, people are deterred from committing the crime and risking severe punishment.158
The reasoning behind the criminalization and the normative mode of enforcement of a perpetrator
of FGC is argued to be deterrence. This benefit-cost theory of the rational actor relies on the
approach that severity of punishment influences behavior if potential offenders weigh the
consequences of their actions and conclude that the risk of punishment is too severe. 159
However, normative criminalization and the traditional mode of enforcement, which takes
place through prosecution resulting in incarceration, cannot be solely relied on to eradicate the
FGC. There appears to be only a tenuous link between peoples’ compliance and the risk associated
with law-breaking behaviour.160

Additionally, evidence from developing countries mainly

indicates that domestic legislative interventions executed in a ‘top-down fashion’ seeking to
change certain cultural norms rarely work,161 and these solutions are not materially deterring the
practice of FGC.
Webb puts forth a thought-provoking statement regarding how investigations have been
focused on “if in fact deviance is inversely related to the celerity, certainty, or severity of
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punishment.”162 He postulates that whether a person contravenes the law depends on three
elements: (i) whether the person has internalized the law as a norm, (ii) whether the person is
merely respecting the fact that it is the law, and (iii) if the person has different criminal standards
which they obey. 163

Furthermore, Stuntz’s notion of internalization complements Webb’s

postulation, “the mass of the population avoids seriously bad behavior not because they know it
can be found in the codes, but because they know the behavior is thought to be seriously bad.” 164
Empirical evidence suggests that people who practice FGC in northern Ghana have conflicting
internalized standards to the law against it. They believe FGC to be an acceptable practice,
embedded in the responsibility of grooming their daughters for adulthood and marriage. 165 This
shows that, contrary to the government prescribing legislation against the practice, the people of
northern Ghana have not internalized FGC to be horrible behaviour, warranting criminal punitive
measures. Hence, criminalization and the fear of incarceration may be known, but since this norm
against FGC has not been internalized, there is a high probability of those in northern Ghana being
persistent with their practice, as they believe it is a good practice.
The relevant internal motivation to not commit a crime, which is the feeling of
responsibility to act appropriately, is achieved through two channels according to Tyler and
Darley: (i) the belief that the law is morally appropriate, and; (ii) the belief that the rules are
legitimate.166 Juxtaposing these internal factors with the reasoning behind FGC reveals that these
factors are not reflective of the people of northern Ghana—as they deem the law to be the
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culmination of a misconstrued ideology, particularly a Western ideology. 167 The fear of criminal
sanctions imposed does not stimulate a law-abiding society. A law-abiding society desires to act
in ethical, socially suitable ways, and this is what the people of northern Ghana believe they are
doing by curbing promiscuity. 168 The second factor of rules being legitimate is automatically
negated, as to them, this law will promote promiscuous behaviour.169
As asserted by proponents of the limitations of the deterrence method, the traditional
deterrence method manifested through criminalization that employs a narrow form of enforcement,
not legitimate to perpetrators, results in the unfortunate result of limited effectiveness in
eradicating FGC. According to Webb, this traditional deterrence method “has not been and needs
to be sensitive to the different pressures to break the law and how these different pressures or
norms must be deterred in different ways.”170 Webb’s postulation indicates that one method of
preventing crime would not deter all crime, especially when the offense is a social norm and is not
deemed to be a crime by the perpetrators.
In light of norms being differentially deterrable, the terms “gentle nudges” and “harsh
shoves”171 are brought into play by Kahan to draw a picture depicting the fact that when laws
impose harsh penalties against an accepted norm, the probability of the police enforcing the norm,
or prosecutors charging will be low.172 This is evident in Ghana, where the number of prosecutions
related to FGC are very few, which reinforces the social norms the State seeks to prevent. A similar
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ideology is accepted by academics who believe that radical approaches such as long sentences,
which strongly depart from preferred customs, are self-defeating. They do nothing to reduce the
incidence substantially and lose credibility. 173 If the law is to have any value at all, it needs to
“stick close to the norms.” 174 Stuntz, speaking on the immense wielding power of social norms
which breed practices such as FGC, notes that “if the law strays too far from the norms, the public
will not respect the law, and hence will not stigmatize those who violate it,”175 losing an essential
principle of the criminal justice system, which is deterrence. 176 Even so, normative criminalization
is deemed to stray far from the norm of FGC as those who practice it consider it to be ethical and
normal.
Drawing from the postulation by Stuntz, since they deem the law to be far from their norm
because it opposes it, normative criminalization winds up being a futile means of eradicating FGC,
as people in that community will not chastise each other for doing the right thing. 177 Societal
pressures are exerted via influential peers to convince a girl to undergo the practice; they exert this
pressure by portraying the girl as a shunned outcast.178 This stems from the immense wielding
power social norms hold—people's actions can be said to be in conformance with their perceptions
of the thoughts of others.179 In this regard, Sunstein defends laws that attempt to change social
norms because where the change of behavior is the objective of the law, social and legal norms
must interact.180
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The relationship between law and the differences between people in society is also
highlighted by the feminist legal theory, which I discuss in the next section. These differences exist
between men and women. Feminist groups have also unfolded the differences between women
based on race and culture, as discussed in the next section.
Feminist Legal Theory
The Essence of the Feminist Legal Theory
At a conference at the Harvard Law School in 1978, the first recorded use of the term
“feminist jurisprudence” 181 was noted. Ann Scales intended to question the “completeness of a
jurisprudence that is not responsive to specifically female concerns.” 182 Since then, the general
aim of feminist legal theory has been focused on critiquing existing patriarchal jurisprudence and
exposing the male bias in the existing legal system and has done so vis-à-vis labour law and human
rights.183 According to Lawson, “feminist legal theory is the study of the relationship between
women and the law.”184 The essence of the feminist legal theory is captured aptly by MDA
Freeman, who describes it as “to analyze the contribution of law in constructing, maintaining,
reinforcing and perpetuating patriarchy, and it looks at ways in which this patriarchy can be
undermined and ultimately eliminated.”185
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The focal point of this theory is women, as it is a legal theory formed by people whose
primary political identification is feminist.186 Being a feminist, according to Bartlett, “is a political
choice about one’s positions on a variety of contestable social issues,” of which FGC is a case in
point.187

Feminist jurisprudence aims to reconstruct legal practices that have disregarded,

undervalued, or undermined women’s concerns. 188 As the law has not accorded the issue of FGC
the level of attention it requires to be eradicated, feminist theories, including the feminist legal
theory, continue to be the most cited theories supporting the eradication of FGC.
The tactical angle of the feminist legal theory developed by women to focus on women
stems from the normalcy of a male point of view in law which contributes to entrenching power
relations in society.189 Menkel-Meadow explains the reason for the male-dominated substance of
the law as “in the beginning, law was male.”190 Law, in the past, explicitly facilitated women’s
exclusion from society. 191 The exclusion of women in the making of the law caused it to be
predisposed to male tendencies. 192 Men, in the making of the law, positioned it to suit their
priorities and concerns. 193 Feminist legal theory aims to “expose biases, and inequality reflected
in this male-created law.194 Evidently the furthest statement from a hyperbole, women were barred
from practicing law in 1873 by the Supreme Court of the United States of America.195 Justice
Bradley was in full support, stating, “the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs
to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.” 196 Justice Bradley’s
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sentiments bear a noticeable similitude to the rationale behind FGC—the marriageability of a
woman is the sole determinant of her purpose and status.197 If both the law and people who practice
FGC have a deep-seated patriarchal backdrop—albeit it may not be explicitly stated—FGC
eradication is a distant achievement. To cut through the web of patriarchy formed across law and
society over decades, feminist theories offer a lens to identify and dismantle patriarchal systems.
Patriarchy is the epochal focus of the feminist theory. Patriarchy, which feminists argue to
be dominant in law and many other spheres, is a powerful system the feminist movement uses to
describe the roots of marginalization. This revolving conduit of abuse of reproductive, political,
and economic rights has been attributed as a leading factor in the causation of FGC, as it is
performed to make a woman marriage worthy. 198 Though FGC has been argued to be instigated
by patriarchy, it is sustained by laws that do not have the capacity to produce the desired effect of
eradication—this is what the feminist legal theory seeks to modify. 199
As patriarchal notions are uncovered, there has been a realization of the fallacy that law is
an “uncontested body of posited rules and principles” and a “perfect science.” 200 Conventional
law is now expressed alongside feminist dissenting views. 201 However, these dissenting views are
expressed as peripheral to actual law. 202 In many instances, feminist perspectives in conventional
law are acknowledged with merely a footnote.203 Feminist theories thus aim to criticize parts of
the law unfavourable to women and exacerbating FGC by veering away from orthodox law, as
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“the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.”204 Social and legal structures cannot
be extensively reformed by working with the tools that facilitate that patriarchal system. 205
Feminist theories are tools to dismantle legal structures and social structures such as FGC that
oppress women.
Patriarchy is apparent in both law and society, which causes a need to analyze patriarchy
in the entanglement of how law and culture affect each other from a feminist perspective. Legal
theory feminists such as MacKinnon are attentive towards the need to improve the social position
of women. 206 Feminist legal theory shines a light on how the law affects society as “unjust social
conditions are bred by the existing legal ideology and rules.” 207

Snyder expands on this

postulation, stating, “law is a part of every day in terms of how it shapes experiences, knowledges,
and perceptions of subjects. While law can be enabling, particularly for legal subjects whose social
locations are privileged and normalized, it can also be extremely constraining, especially for
people who are already marginalized.” 208 Girls on whom FGC is performed are marginalized, and
the law can be highly constraining instead of enabling for these girls.
The prevalent debate in early feminism was the sameness/difference debate. 209 The vexed
question was: are men and women the same? This question originated from the exclusionary basis
of law to women hinged on differences.210 Based on this exclusion, early feminists geared all their
energies towards showing that women and men were the same and should be treated the same
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way. 211 This argument in favour of sameness ceased to gain momentum when it came to the issue
of pregnancy. Should women be treated like men even when pregnant? 212 Based on the sameness
argument, the answer will be a yes as formal equality implies “sameness of treatment regardless
of one’s background and falls short of creating solutions to societal issues peculiar to women.” 213
As urgently required, the differences between men and women, biologically and socially,
necessitated the law addressing the unique position of women. 214 For example, there was a need
for the law to legitimize sex-specific rules based on the biological difference between women and
pregnancy. 215 In favour of the theory of difference, Menkel-Meadow notes that “law must be
responsive to the specificity of women’s particular needs.”216 Historically, women have not been
accounted for when it comes to the law.217 For example, rape was defined in male terms. 218 The
redefinition of the law concerning crimes included the reconceptualization of consent in rape
defense.219 In the same way, the law must be responsive to the specificity of women’s needs with
regard to the issue of FGC as a deeply rooted cultural phenomenon and not a normative crime.
Within the male/female difference also exists a subcategory of difference. Women are also
different from women as factors such as race, class, and sexuality cause a further categorization
within the broader categorization of women. The next section addresses how these differences
have been highlighted within the feminist legal theory to show a need to take an intersectional
approach in eradicating FGC.
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Addressing Differences: Essentialism and Intersectionality
Feminist theories, in light of the differences between women, have subsequently
proliferated into many “sister groups,”220 as Price calls them, or “ruptures” as Menkel-Meadow
labels them. 221 These proliferations have developed a rich range of theories that seek to wipe out
“methods of social control whereby half the human race has been sacrificed to the interests of the
other half.”222 Angela Harris, for instance, breaks away from and criticizes the off-kilter element
of the feminist legal theory, which she labels essentialism. 223 Essentialism does not consider that
all women are not the same; claims about women tend to assume they are all white, non-disabled,
not immigrants, economically privileged, educated, and heterosexual—this is the essential
women’s experience.224 In her book, Women, Race and Class, Davis notes, “not all women are
white, and not all women enjoyed the comfort of the middle-class life” as essentialism focuses on
problems exclusive to this category of women. 225
Along with many other feminist women of colour, Kline and Thornhill acknowledge the
overt racism reflected in conventional feminism. 226 Expanding on Thornhill’s perspective, Kline
considers the “diversity of women’s experiences of oppression.” 227 According to her, there should
be an analysis of the different perspectives based on class and other characteristics that differentiate
women, such as ethnic traditions. 228

This consideration emanates from the criticism that
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MacKinnon’s work did not sufficiently include black and indigenous perspectives. Instead, she
categorized an essentialist experience as the women’s experience. 229
Along with intersectionality kicked off by Kimberly Crenshaw, essentialism has been
characterized as the “most significant challenge” to feminism. 230 Intersectionality, which is antiessentialism, reflects a transdisciplinary theory to capture how multiple complex interconnected,
overlapping dimensions of social identities intertwine and exacerbate inequalities. 231 Women who
have undergone FGC are the epitome of this intersectionality. Most significantly, a woman who
has fled her home country due to the practice stands at the crossroads of many identities: culture,
immigrant status, race, ethnicity, and gender.232 Intersectionality also recognizes and traces all
these compounded and simultaneous inequalities that “get lost in traditional categorical
analysis.”233 These identities individually carry a burden that the essentialist woman may not
experience, explaining the essence of Harris’s postulation—there is a need to regard difference.
Anti-discrimination laws, according to Crenshaw, create “exclusionary frames” and
operate on a “single-axis” analysis excluding other important identities of discrimination. 234 This
takes the form of focusing on how being a woman is the reason why a person goes through FGC
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without acknowledging how this combines with ethnicity to cause a girl to be mutilated.235
According to Crenshaw, this single-axis perception of identities used in legal doctrine, feminist
and anti-racist theories and practices have their limits and do not encompass the totality of
experiences of many women.236 Single-axis analyses such as these ignore the “synergistic and
convergence effect that the interaction of two or more axes of power may have.”237 Bond observes
that “critical race feminism has taught us about the danger of relying on a unified, monolithic
description of women’s experience, and it is time now to extend those lessons into the arena of
international women’s human rights.”238 Intersectionality offers a different way of reading and
understanding multiple identities coalescing to cause inequality. 239
Bond highlights an occurrence that included intersectionality based on ethnicity. 240 In
1988, Chinese women were raped in Indonesia by the Indonesian ethnic majority, where the
Chinese women were the ethnic minority. 241 Due to them being the minority, they received death
threats coupled with the trauma of rape.242 The international community, however, did not address
this issue as an intersectional one. As noted by Bond, they failed to recognize this situation as a
result of both racism and sexism.” 243 Agreeing with the intersectional gap that exists, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that “the United Nations intergovernmental
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organizations and non-governmental organizations have too often addressed racial and gender
discrimination as two separate problems, leaving women faced by multiple forms of discrimination
unsure where to turn to redress.”244
Like Indigenous feminist legal theory, black feminist legal theory should take into account
feminist legal theory that “generates an intersectional, multi-juridical, anti-colonial, antiessentialist reading of the law that is crucial to a multitude of fields.” 245 In Indigenous legal theory,
gender-neutral approaches usually depend on the “universal male subject.” 246 These approaches
are deemed to apply to everyone.247 As the sameness/difference debate ensued, men were the
infallible “standard of analysis. 248 Littleton questions the source of women being determined as
the different gender, away from the normalcy. In response to this, she states, “men are just as
different from women as women are from men.” 249
As FGC is caught in the centre of ethnicity, race, and gender, these sister group lenses help
answer how we can cater to the cultural practice of FGC as there is a need for a “holistic and
culturally relevant approach” 250 that could bring a nuanced understanding of FGC and cause
international and domestic change beneficial to those going through it.251 Ow questioned whether
unique identities are represented in the law, which then begs the question: Are the unique identities
of those practicing FGC adequately represented in the law? 252 This thesis is situated within the
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feminist legal scholarly movement for these reasons. There exists in international human rights,
missed opportunities for an intersectional approach,253 including with FGC.
It is a stark fact that the practice of FGC is harmful and needs to be eradicated. However,
legal measures need to consider ethnicity, race, gender, and other factors peculiar to individuals
and groups. In light of these differences, particularly race and ethnicity, in the next section, I
discuss TWAIL, a theory that concentrates on the point of view of people from developing
countries. TWAIL, considering the background of inhabitants of developing countries—primarily
Black, Indigenous, and other people of color—reacts to international law’s western and
imperialistic nature, which does not consider race, ethnicity, and culture.
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)
TWAIL is a reactive intellectual movement in the sense that it responds to international
law as an imperial project, as it stems from “European thought, history, culture and experience.” 254
History is put forward as a significant problem in international law, and as noted by TWAIL, legal
systems cannot be acknowledged as distinct from the history responsible for the inception of these
systems. 255 From the 1997 TWAIL Vision Statement vision, TWAIL has been cognizant of and
has revolved around the need to assess history. 256 TWAILs Vision Statement is as follows: “We
understand the historical scope and agenda of the dominant voice of international law scholarship
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as having participated in, and legitimated global processes of marginalization and domination that
impact the lives and struggles of third world peoples.”257
According to Okafor, this history of colonial subordination and the imposition of European
power on the world is taken very seriously by TWAIL. 258 This is because the history of
international law was molded to suit its primary beneficiaries. 259 Hence, TWAIL does not evade
tackling colonialism and the complexity that comes with it.260 Instead, TWAIL creates avenues to
thoroughly engage in discussions concerning colonial systems to overcome this historical
legacy. 261 To TWAIL, colonial history should not be treated as a dead letter, as its effects are still
ongoing.262
As a historical analytical theory, this thesis utilizes TWAIL as a tool to attempt to grasp
the history of international law from the perspective of third-world states, particularly concerning
FGC. 263 TWAIL is a group concerned about those in the third world, coupled with the keen interest
to show how international law has affected the third world. This thesis analyzes how the history
of international law has impacted its efficacy to curb FGC effectively. Gathii notes that some issues
in third world countries “can best be understood by re-examining the relationship between
international law and colonialism.” 264 In the same way, Ramina notes that the validity of legal
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doctrines that affect the third world can be re-examined through the history of these doctrines,
which this thesis seeks to do in its focus on FGC.265 Although international law is not the only
system responsible for enabling certain practices in the third world, TWAIL draws attention to
how international law is a part of the problem, and in this thesis, how international law has failed
to curb FGC effectively. 266
TWAIL shows how the colonial system was a result of Eurocentric rules of international
law. TWAILs aim extends beyond the past and looks at the present. TWAIL demonstrates these
Eurocentric systems are still ongoing in the post-colonial period.267 Gathii notes that “whereas
Nkrumah may have spoken in the language of neo-colonialism, TWAILERs speak in the language
of colonial continuities and discontinuities.” 268 TWAIL seeks to dismantle existing hierarchical
power structures because “equality or equity cannot be attained under existing ideological and
institutional structures.”269 Shetty has emphasized that the post in postcolonial does not signify an
end to colonization, but rather the “continuation of colonialism in the consciousness of formerly
colonized peoples, and in institutions imposed in the process of colonization.” 270 In light of this,
this thesis traces what has occurred in the history of international law. It also outlines how there is
a continuation of colonialism through legal systems.
Additionally, TWAIL is also forward-looking as it “signifies the emergence of distinctive
ways of engaging with what international law is or should be” and providing a new way of
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understanding and practicing international law. 271 Makau, in envisaging solutions and new ways
of practicing international law, states, “the human rights movement must be moored in the cultures
of all peoples.”272 Sibian postulates that “the eradication of FGC as a cultural practice is much
more complicated than simply formulating discriminatory laws that may not reach into such
clandestine settings” 273 This statement legitimizes the claims of TWAIL, as it signifies a need to
reframe human rights to reach such clandestine settings. 274 TWAIL provides an alternative to
conventional international law.275 This thesis proposes vernacularization as an alternative to
conventional international law to address the issue of FGC. As TWAIL is against the western
venture that international criminal law is and criticizes western assumptions as a yardstick to
evaluate legal mechanisms, vernacularization offers a system that merges international law and
moores it in the culture of the people. 276
TWAIL scholarship is against the “universalization of specific cultures under the guise of
promoting global order, peace, and security.” 277 Criticism that erupts against instruments such as
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) are
often geared at how they are “insensitive to the nuanced and culture-specific perspectives that they
target.”278 Although human rights have been established by international mechanisms as universal,
there are limits to how far these universal rights can go when addressing issues such as FGC, as
these universal rights do not recognize the cultural basis of the practice, but simply deem the
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practice as a crime.279 Instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 280 have
also been criticized for not implementing a “holistic approach and has been conceived by some
critics as a form of cultural imperialism.” 281 Legal scholars have attributed the “disregard by
reformists of local legal reality” 282 as the reason for the failure of the law to curb practices such as
FGC. To an extent, TWAIL advocates for cultural relativism as it calls for sensitivity, inclusion,
and “tolerance for difference.”283 To them, universalism represents the first world.284 According
to Mutua, Western liberalism has been masked as universalism—essentially false universalism
produced by Western colonial powers from their historical context.285
In the pursuit of dismantling ineffective structures, TWAIL refuses to “treat as sacred any
norm, process, or institution of either domestic or international law if they birth, legitimize, and
maintain harmful hierarchies and injustice.”286 This means that if the domestic law of Ghana for
instance, is fostering harmful hierarchies and remnants of an imperialist regime, TWAIL can be
used as a tool for reform in that regard as well.
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Political Movements at an Intersection: Feminism and TWAIL
As two critical theories that focus on marginalization, pseudo-equality, and respect and
justice, 287 there is a striking similitude between feminist theories and TWAIL.

288

Law, and

international law more specifically, was formed when women and third world nations were
systematically prevented from partaking in the law. 289 Both TWAIL and feminist legal theorists
argue that the substance of law would have been developed differently if feminists and third-world
people contributed to it.290 This is particularly important for the laws against FGC as it affects
women from third-world counties. The valuable contribution of feminists and persons from third
world countries would have made a mark on the law—a female and third world mark.291
In international law, there are the mainstays—white, able-bodied, middle-class, Christian,
heterosexual—while there are the others which in this context is third world people of colour.
Specifically, women of colour who are at the crossroads of TWAIL and feminist theories. Minow,
observes this and states, “the legal treatment contains “an assumed point of comparison: women
are compared to the unstated norm of men, minority races to whites, handicapped persons to the
able-bodied, and minority religions to majorities.”292 Laws are therefore shaped for the needs of
these mainstay groups. Feminists observe how the law's intended beneficiaries are male, and
similarly, TWAIL analyzes how the intended beneficiaries of international law are white. 293
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However, feminists and TWAIL move beyond identifying and challenge the aspects of the existing
legal system that exclude or disadvantage women and those from the third world. 294
It has also been argued that the law’s proclivity to classify all people under one category
stems from the white woman’s influence on the law.295 White women have been engaging with
state law since the first wave of feminism and are still the “centre of legal advocacy.” 296 Although
white women were marginalized within patriarchy, they played a vital role in the enslavement of
African women.297 As a result, there is still a need for feminist legal theorists to “examine how
they were a part of, and involved in colonization.” 298 Flowing from this postulation, there is also a
need to understand the interrelation between race, gender, and colonialism in theorizing.299 This
analysis falls at the intersection of TWAIL and feminist legal theory.
As an influential group, there is a tendency for white people from western countries to
reflect their perspectives as the singular universal voice due to the power they wield.300 Therefore,
law purports to speak for all with a universal positivistic language but fails to include the
perspectives of the third world and women. 301 A universal language is usually opposed because it
excludes many voices, and cannot be labeled as universal. 302 Feminism and third-world issues
cannot be neatly tucked and unified under a singular universal perspective. 303 Assuming all persons
from third-world countries are a monolith causes the west to overlook the complexities that exist,
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which is essentialist.304 According to Bond, universalism “thrives of generalizations” and has
“become an easy way to dismiss charges of cultural imperialism.” 305
Similar to the feminist legal theory, TWAIL’s logic is revealed through the lived history
of people from third-world countries, as these lived histories cannot be ignored. 306 An analysis of
the history of international law must include the lens of those who experienced colonialism,
imperialism, and subjugation by Western states.307 The voices that were omitted from conventional
world history must be accounted for. 308 As intersectionality goes beyond gender, there must be an
analysis of the lived experiences of women from third world countries, focusing on how different
forms of oppression have coalesced to affect their day to day lives. 309
Both TWAIL and feminist theories have evolved into methodologies. 310 Arising from
understanding the lived experiences of women is the feminist or woman question: what does this
law or opinion mean for the woman? 311 This includes all women everywhere, and in the context
of this thesis, the third-world woman. 312 This method of questioning has subsequently become a
methodology and a primary process of critique. 313 According to Bartlett, when a question is asked
frequently, it evolves into a methodology. 314 Methods “organizes the apprehension of truth; it
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determines what counts as evidence and defines what is taken as verification.” 315 The woman
question asks about the gender implications of a social practice or rule. What difference would it
make to do so? “Asking the woman question involves examining how the law fails to take into
account the experiences and values that seem more typical of women than of men, for whatever
reason, or how existing legal standards and concepts might disadvantage women.” 316
Similarly, TWAIL has been described by Okafor as a methodology. 317 Okafor compares
the meaning of methodology in the Oxford dictionary to the TWAILs approaches to arrive at this
conclusion.318 Methodology as a “science of method” or a “body of methods used in an activity”
juxtaposed with the activity of international legal analysis by TWAIL qualifies it as a
methodology, similarly to the feminist legal theory.319 This international legal analysis is
compromised of the methodological determination of TWAIL to analyze the history of
international law, characterize the continuities that still exist from this historical analysis, and reconstruct the image of international law that has dominated for centuries.320
These theoretical frameworks show how different societies require tailoring of the law to
suit their social needs. The theoretical frameworks exist as a basis to (i) analyze the history of
international law in chapter three (ii) To work towards an intersectional framework to solve FGC
in chapter five. In the next section, I use TWAIL’s historical methodology to demonstrate how the
development of international law was Eurocentric and how international law, based on this
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development, gravitates towards a specific international standard which is opposed to the culture
of communities practicing FGC, as described in chapter one.
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CHAPTER 3
International Law: The Seeping of European Legal Culture
As it is today, international law cannot be separated from its history as its present-day
system is, to a high extent, a continuation of its core values. Watertight principles, such as pacta
sunt servanda that emanated from legal customs and agreements centuries ago, are still in force.
Hence the historical conditions surrounding these agreements are relevant. 321 These historical
surroundings create an avenue to reconcile present international happenings to their source. The
relevance of the history of international law is intensified by the claim that its roots are predisposed
to ethnocentric tendencies.322 Hence, the history of international law cannot be taken at face value
but must be explored to understand this criticism and the indignation that emanates. Face value in
this scenario is the entrenched narrow point of view which reflects a beneficial European and
Western history of international law without exploring the imposition of European legal culture
and its effects.323 This point of view does not account for varying perspectives of the Global
South.324 This gives rise to the significant need to assess international law and its history through
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a different lens—a non-Eurocentric lens. This chapter gives expression to lost perspectives such
as the obscured angle of colonialism and imperialism, which underscores the culture of
international law and its status quo.325 The idealistic projection of international law is the
universalized product of a myriad of past societies, causing the law not to be distinctly antithetical
to the culture of one society over another. However, this chapter traces the development of
European law as international law and explores how European international law and legal culture,
which is opposed to the culture of Ghanaians, was both imposed and seeped into the culture of
Ghana. The Ghanaian culture here enables FGC. 326
Reflecting on these historical accounts, this chapter illustrates how some of these
occurrences are still present today, and most importantly, how it causes the values of international
law to be incompatible with the values of the Global South, and in this study, Ghana. This
European legal culture that permeates international law causes it to be inadequate to curb FGC.
The Influence of Roman Antiquity
Geographically, the model system of international law, which developed exponentially in
the 19th – 20th century, materialized almost entirely in Europe.327 Almost without exception, the
nascent stages of international law embody the Greek and Roman civilizations of antiquity. Other
European states adopted the Roman legal system fused inextricably with canon law. The Romans
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were deemed the premier jurists and political architects, and the Greeks were seen as veering away
from a legally myopic system, looking towards the development of an international approach. 328
Ius gentium, of ancient Roman origin, is credited as the source of international law which
represented the law of nations.329 As one of the earliest accounts of legal pluralism, dating back
to 242 B.C., ius gentium was valid amongst all as it was the prevailing law when a conflict of laws
erupted, warranting its classification as the “third system of law.” 330

Ius gentium was a

compendium of intertribal law that represented common elements and customs of all nations the
Romans had come into contact with.331 However, because this system emanated in Rome, coupled
with the fact that a praetor peregrinus of Rome established it, ius gentium was heavily influenced
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by Roman law.332 Intensely imbued within the Roman legal system, there was an interaction, and
invariably, an influence of Roman municipal law on ius gentium and vice versa. 333 Bearing a
striking similarity to universalism which is reflected in modern-day international law, ius gentium
reflected the essence of the religious ius naturale. Ius naturale is the necessary divine and superior
law which applies to all living beings.334 In this light, ius gentium was established as a legitimate
body of rules among all men—Romans and foreigners. 335 Distinctly carrying a Roman and
European religious universalizing ethos, this system was the beginning of European international
law, which influenced modern international law. 336
Rome was deemed to be the birthplace of European civilization, which eventually birthed
modern international law. Subsequently, states such as Britain and Germany, which continued this
trajectory of European civilization, adopted Roman principles. It cannot be disputed that Roman
law and British law were linked as there was a conquest of large parts of Great Britain by the
Romans, giving rise to territories of Great Britain being under Roman dominion. 337 This created
a Romanised province of Britain for almost one-hundred and twenty years.338
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jurisprudence, due to this protracted entanglement, was influenced by Roman law.339

On

practically every front pertinent to law, there was a permeation of Christianity. England had
ecclesiastical courts that solely administered Canon law, and running parallel to this, English
equity was slowly infused with ius gentium.340
In examining the influence of Rome on Germany, the constitution of the German Imperial
Chamber of Justice in 1495 is a case in point. Sixteen justices were needed for this institution to
take form.341 The German Emperor Maximilian instructed that half of the sixteen justices must be
doctors of Roman Law and that the court should “adjudicate in accordance with the Common Law
of the Empire”—the Empire being the Roman Empire. 342 Another mirroring of Roman law in
Germany is the Buirgerlihes Gesetzbuch (civil code of Germany).343 Codified by the German
Pandectists, this comprehensive civil code reflects Roman law. The system of law manifested in
the civil code was gemeines Recht, which translated, is the Roman ius commune brought into force
by Roman Emperor Justinian.344 The influence of Roman law on both Germany and Britain
collectively comes to light, primarily through canon law. In England, before the reign of William
the Conqueror, the sheriff and the bishop sat together in the Anglo-Saxon County Courts,
signifying the inseparable nature of law and religion, which became an integral component of

339

Roscoe JC Dorsey, "Roman Sources of Some English Principles of Equity and Common Law Rules" (1938) 8:12
Am L Sch Rev 1233 at 1233. John Hill Burton, History of Scotland from Agricola's Invasion to the Revolution of
1688 (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood., 1867) at 41.
340
Ibid at 1234-1236.
341
Ibid at 1234.
342
Ibid at 1234.
343
"The Teaching of Roman Law" [1914] 13: Part 2 J Soc Comp Legis ns 171 at 173.
344
Ibid; Maurice Sheldon Amos, "The Common Law and the Civil Law in the British Commonwealth of Nations"
(1937) 50:8 Harv L Rev 1249 at 1252-1254.

57

German and British adjudication.345 The influence of canon law surpassed the confines of religious
matters and transcended public and private law. 346
European civilization, influenced by Roman legal culture, evolved into international law
as it is today. 347 A rationale for this claim stems from the spatial concentration of international
agreements, treaties, and binding documents generally concluded in these regions during the
embryonic stages of international law. 348 Some of the early accounts of international agreements
concluded in Europe range from treaties that united and brought peace, such as the Peace of
Westphalia, to ones that created legal institutions that molded the trajectory of adjudication, such
as the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
The foundations of the law of war dating to the 19th century were also moulded by
European civilization. Following the first international convention on the law of war in Geneva in
1864, the codification of the law of war was set in motion on the European continent 349 The
Institute of International Law, a private institution that codifies international law, created the
Oxford Manual on the law of war on land.” 350 Johann Casper Blutschli, a professor at the
University of Heidelberg, in 1866 also drafted a comprehensive private draft on the law of war.
This was followed by The Declaration of St. Petersburg in 1868 and the draft international
agreement concerning the laws and customs of war drafted by delegates of 15 European states in
Brussels in 1874, upon the initiative of Czar Alexander II of Russia. 351 Although this agreement
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was never ratified, it served as a blueprint for the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 on the
laws and customs of war on land. 352 These conventions, built on the drafts of European jurists and
major European powers, constitute a comprehensive codification for international law of war
customs.353
The more inclusive Hague Convention of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 that
ensued decades later supplemented the main conventions but did not replace previous
conventions.354

Protocol I supplemented rules governing international armed conflicts and

reiterated the principle of unnecessary suffering. Protocol I also extended other elements of the
Protocol affording protection to medical aircraft flying over areas not controlled by an adverse
party.355 Protocol II extended the protections of the Conventions as they relate to internal armed
conflicts.356 On the other hand, principles such as those governing the meter-and-a-half horizontal
green hull band prescribed for hospital ships from the Hague Convention X of 1907 were deleted
from the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Wounded and Sick.
Additionally, principles such as privateering, which is the carrying of hostilities on vessels
owned by private persons, were banned by the Declaration of Paris 1856. 357 Sections were added
and deleted from the foundational Conventions; however, they were not replaced and are still in
force to a great extent. Hence, currently, the international law of war, barring some exceptions of
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supplementation and deletions, was formed by the Europeans and bore the hallmarks of European
civilization.358
However, these momentous international developments extended beyond the scope of
geography, and due to the European diplomatic and spatial concentration of these treaties and
agreements, veered into the development of a shared culture and belief system. This shared culture
and belief system was codified in agreements such as the Peace of Westphalia and Hague
Conventions related to the law of war, a system born of the similitude of interests of its members. 359
The Peace of Westphalia is the name of the treaties of Munster and Osnabriick signed in 1648
between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their respective Allies to end Thirty
Years of War after five years of negotiation. 360
Legal agreements do not automatically emanate; they reflect recognized shared viewpoints
regarding the appropriate way of administering justice. 361 As a starting point, states involved in
the signing of the Peace of Westphalia shared similar recognized perspectives of the ideal
composition of a government or state. This ideal composition of states was evidenced by the
sameness of the titles and corresponding roles of state representatives and heads of states, which
enabled compatibility in coordinating the Peace of Westphalia. This European Assembly was
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represented by plenipotentiaries including the Counts of Trautmansdorf and Weinsberg, Nassau,
Catzenellebogen, Vianden, and Dietz, Duke of Longueville, and Estouteville, Lord Arch-Duke
Ferdinand Charles. Among other delegates was the Baron of Gleichenberg, Neustadt, Negan,
Burgau, and Torzenbach, Lord of Teinitz. There were also many Knights, Commanders,
Superintendents, Governors, Lieutenant Generals, Princes, and Lords.
This special composition of states shared by territories involved in the signing of
Westphalia sprouted seeds of European civilization and its necessary corollary, sovereignty. The
concept of sovereignty first came to light in 1577 through the work of Bodin in his treatise
“Republics.”362 However, tracing the history of sovereignty and its interconnectivity to peace has
often led scholars to the Peace of Westphalia with good reason.363 Although the treaty did not
have explicit statements of the declaration of sovereignty, and although the concept of sovereignty
developed before 1648, the Peace of Westphalia is recognized for the evolution of sovereignty.
This is first because each territory recognized other territories as the ultimate authority in their
respective territories. This was an implicit legitimation of sovereignty, although these states were
not, in practice, wholly sovereign.364 Hence, the Peace of Westphalia’s contribution to sovereignty
was its implicit recognition through the references to the legitimate powers that territorial heads
and representatives possessed and also, the proclamation of the equality of the German Stände.
(estates)365 While not a full-blown organized system of sovereignty, the treaty developed an
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inceptive form of sovereignty flowing from European civilization. One of the qualifying
parameters which prevented these territories from being entirely sovereign is that they had
limitations to adhere to and did not have absolute power.366
Sovereign states determine the pathway of their existence in collaboration with other states
through mutual respect and agreements. 367 This definition of sovereignty materialized during the
Peace of Westphalia. The Stände were recognized to partake in making decisions regarding the
Empire and form alliances with each other and foreign powers.368 This recognition granted a form
of autonomy akin to the establishment of the principle of sovereignty and the development of a
federative Empire. 369
Another reason why The Peace of Westphalia is recognized as the source of civilization
and sovereignty is that it represented the large-scale and widely documented landmark for
European political and legal history. All the major European powers took part in this treaty. 370
This gave a unique legitimacy to the Peace of Westphalia as the legal expression of the valid order
of Europe. The magnitude of the treaties signed caused the Peace of Westphalia to be seen as the
implied recognition of a Société des nations among them as sovereign states.371
Notions of Christianity were rife in principles of the Peace of Westphalia. The notion of
sovereignty in its budding state by Hobbes and Bodin is linked to the existence of the divine and
natural law. 372 Their aim was towards the building of a hierarchical power that solely administered
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domestic law.373 Additionally, Paragraph I of the Treaty of Westphalia begins with “There shall
be a Christian and Universal Peace….” The end of the preamble ends with “…to the Glory of God,
and the Benefit of the Christian World, the following Articles have been agreed on and consented
to, and the same run thus.”374 Likewise, many references in the treaty have religious connotations
which are solely Christian. Christianity permeated the development and implementation of legal
principles, signifying the inextricable link between Christianity and European law. The continuous
reification of these European shared beliefs of civilization, sovereignty, and religion were
documented as international law through agreements such as the Peace of Westphalia. 375
The influence of civilization and religion was evidenced in agreements such as the Peace
of Westphalia and the Congress of Vienna in concert with Grotius’ De lure Belli ac Pacis libri tres
(1625). All of European essence, these documents have been recognized as the origin of ius
publicum Europaeum which extended to the rest of the world as international law. 376 The
European ethos eminent during Congress and evident in other agreements was affirmed at the
Congress of Berlin by the delegate of France, M. Waddington. He noted that Serbia which wanted
to join the European family, must “recognize the principles which are the basis of social
organization in all states of Europe and accept them as a necessary condition of the favor which
she asks for.”377 Decades prior to this, Alexander the Great, Ceasar, and Napolean believed that
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the Mediterranean civilization of Greece, Rome, and Paris formed of the Graeco-Latin evolution
should be the concept of civilization for the universe. 378
These European states used civilization as a tool to displace traditional practices and
systems that run contrary to European values of civilization and, parallel to this, as a tool for the
universalization of European international law.
The Qualifying Parameter: Civilization
While the formulation of mechanisms for interacting with other states ensued between
European states, there was a continuous unveiling of different cultures which did not fall within
this umbrella of similitude—this similitude being European civilization and legal culture.379 This
difference rendered them inferior and caused other territories to be characterized as ‘barbaric’ and
‘uncivilized.’380 Due to the differences in belief systems, the European legal and political culture
did not coalesce harmoniously with the culture of other states.381 The confidence European states
had in their systems and beliefs, coupled with the doubt they had for the legal personality of states
outside this sphere, ripened into a sense of superiority. 382 Refusing to offer equal status to
‘uncivilized barbarians,’ which included those from Africa, was the corollary of this inflamed selfproclaimed superiority based mainly on religion and civilization. 383
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In the 1800s, the standard of civilization was a precursor for the family of nations. 384 The
main criterion for participating in this global society was civilization. A civilized state was a legal
and political entity governing a defined territory under sovereign state power. 385 Requirements
imposed included “minimum of efficiency in running the State machinery, a modicum of
independence of the judiciary from the executive, and adequate protection of the safety, life,
liberty, dignity, and property of foreigners.”386 These requirements, as Gong implies, were to
prevent conflicts between different customs and traditions of other civilizations. 387
Ultimately, the aim of the standard of civilization was legal harmonization revolving
around European legal culture, causing a single legal culture. 388 The trait attributed to societies
deemed primitive was the non-existence of proper law—that is, the system for enacting, enforcing,
and administering the law as the Europeans knew it.389 If a state or territory did not fit in this
qualifying parameter or was disinclined to accept European civilization’s legal rules and moral
values, they were deemed unfit to be members of the family of nations. 390 Essentially, the standard
of civilization was measured against European civilization. 391 Hence, civilization was an
imperative term utilized by Europeans to displace traditional practices and systems that run
contrary to European values of civilization. 392
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The standards and ruling committees responsible for determining the standard of
civilization were entirely composed of European countries with a similar characterization of
civilization. This exclusionist society conceived of European civilization assumed the ultimate
authority to determine the qualifying parameters of civilization and membership into the family of
nations. 393 In essence, the family of nations was what had been authorized by civilized European
states and caused a sharp divide in the legal order between Europeanized civilized states and
uncivilized states.394
The formation of an exclusive society responsible for determining the standard of
civilization was manifested during the Congress of Vienna in 1815. 395 The Congress of Vienna is
one of the constitutional moments defining the bedrock of European diplomacy and formed the
foundation of European public law stretching decades. 396 Therefore, 1815 is often highlighted as
the date “for the beginning of the contemporary system of global governance.” 397

393

At this

Anand, "Attitude of the Asian-African States toward Certain Problems of International Law" supra note 323 at
58-60. European countries were the ‘powerful countries. However, as with the formulation of many other rules such
as rules of war, this society of European states and members determined what constituted ‘civilization. These do not
have the same meanings today. Thus, the terms " civilisation " or " civilised nations," still used in Articles 9 and 88
(1) (c) of the Statute of the World Court or in Article 8 of the Statute of the International Law Commission;
Kleinschmidt, supra note 391 at pp 280-283; Paulina Starski & Jorn Axel Kammerer, "Imperial Colonialism in the
Genesis of International Law - Anomaly or Time of Transition" (2017) 19:1 J Hist Int'l L 50 at 50; Douglas
Howland, "Japan's Civilized War: International Law as Diplomacy in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)" (2007)
9:2 J Hist Int'l L 179. “The family of nations is originally of European origin as the idea of a family or society of
nations dates back to the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, with the writings of Francisco de Vitoria,
Francisco Suarez, Albericus Gentilis, and Hugo Grotius.”
394
Li-ann Thio, "Cross-Cultural Exchange of Human Rights: Crossing Divides or Crossing Swords" (2015) 14:1 J
Hum Rts 60 at 61; Bowden, supra note 324 at 15; Mikael F Nabati, "Gerry Simpson Great Powers and Outlaw State:
Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004)" (2003) 16:2
Rev quebecoise de droit int'l 383 at 383.
395
Anand, "Attitude of the Asian-African States toward Certain Problems of International Law" supra note 323 at
58; James Harvey, Beard Robinson, Charles Austin, Development of Modern Europe (Boston: Ginn., 1929) The
Congress of Vienna in 1815 also marked the coalescing of many agreements in Europe into a “Final Act.”; Murphy,
supra note 354 at pp 189-190. The Congress of Vienna imposed a peace on France and Napoleon's allies.
396
Harry Pratt Judson, Europe in the Nineteenth Century (Meadville, Pa: Flood and Vincent., 1898) at 72 and 76;
Nabati, supra note 395 at 383. “The two Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907; the 1945 San Francisco
Conference, which "reconciled the requirements of the Great Powers for legalized hegemony and the demands of the
middle and smaller powers for some form of sovereign equality"
397
Murphy, supra note 354 at 189.

66

conference, there was a reconstruction of Europe, causing a balance of power during which a few
great powers officially appointed themselves as the authority to admit new states into the European
society.398 As the European society was the only society encompassed of civilized states, it was
equated to an international society. 399 The Congress of Vienna legitimized an extension of the
authority of the great powers to other nations beyond Europe and granted the authority of the great
powers to admit or refuse entry into the family of nations. 400 These great powers initiated a “sacred
trust of civilization”

401

to teach territories that had not accepted the western standard of

civilization.402 Accordingly, the great powers initiated a system that guaranteed rule over the
continent and the legalization of hegemony extending centuries. 403
Like the Peace of Westphalia, the Congress of Vienna was essentially European in its
composition as all European nations except Turkey were represented, causing the Congress to
build into a system born of common interests of European countries. 404 Particular to the family is
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a common system of civilization and “stock of moral ideas.” 405 Although the European legal
culture was veering away from a system based on Christendom, there was a common shared belief
still particular to Europeans based on civilization. 406 There are key differences in civilizations,
ranging from moral practices to normative judgments, and the Congress of Vienna is a significant
example of how the moral practices and shared beliefs of Europe differed from Africa. 407
During the Congress, decisions were made regarding common interests such as the slave
trade and the division of African territories, as Europeans controlled these regions. 408

In

concordance with their common evolving value prohibiting slave trade under international law,
prepositions were discussed during the Congress. 409

These shared principles constituting

European legal culture affected other territories such as Africa, once again solidifying international
relations and law as an extension of European legal culture. 410
One meaning of civilization to Europe that equated European power was military power.411
Europe was aware of the type of territory they would like to welcome into the family of nations,
and hence, exercised their admitting power arbitrarily. The West accepted Ottoman Turkey and
Japan as full or almost complete members (as they were on probation) of the international society
or family of nations in the 1850s to the 1890s, as they had attained the required ‘standard of
civilization.’412 Japan was also accepted into the family of nations after conducting commercial
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relations with the Great Powers for over 30 years. 413 Japan had not only effectively adopted
European civilization but also had robust military power.414 Japan conquered China (1894-1895)
and Russia (1904-1905), seized Taiwan (1895) and Korea (1910).415
The family of nations diminished the status of African and Asian states. They became states
competing to be recognized, although they had their legal systems. 416 If other states met these
implicit and explicit criteria, this offered a ticket to the close circle. If not, the uncivilized tag
continued to hang over territories not included in the family of nations. 417 The standard of
civilization reinforced the need for a European system, as states had to conform to the political and
legal status quo of enacting, enforcing, and administering the law of European states to be
incorporated into the League of Nations. 418

This caused a universalization of European

civilization, causing the standard of civilization to be a valuable tool to disseminate European
culture.419 It was a system to create a globally uniform legal system based on similar values and
norms, classified as universalism today. 420
Europeans imposed their version of what an appropriate legal system should be. 421 This
vicious way of social marginalization is embedded in imperialism and colonialism. 422 In managing
413
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the opposed ethos’ with non-civilized territories, international law was, in essence, an imposed
system of European law in its beliefs, structure, and implementation through colonialism. 423
Colonization was used to conquer states such as Ghana, catalyzing a full legal
incorporation of these states into the European legal system.
Colonialism as a Tool of Imposition and Assimilation of European Legal Culture
To advance the European standard of civilization and assist territories teetering on the brink
of crisis, colonialism was initiated as a solution. 424 To European states, developments made in
material systems rendered them civilized and superior to other territories. 425 As international law
metamorphosed into a global society, it becomes strikingly more apparent that European states
never wanted equality to be the cornerstone of international law. They wanted the full
incorporation of non-European states under their authority. 426 The aim was never to coordinate
with other nations but to subjugate them.427 As described by the Oxford Dictionary of African
Politics, colonialism is, in essence, “The political takeover and domination of one country by
another, such that it becomes a colony governed by a foreign administration and is integrated into
the empire of the metropole.”428
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Colonialism emerged as a new market as there was a need to replace slavery with the semislavery system of colonialism. 429 The development of colonialism and the force that underpins
colonialism presents an unequivocal acknowledgment of the aggressiveness underlying the
expansion of European legal culture.430 Owing to European states, as of 1949, three-fourths of the
world were at the same place their ancestors were during the slave trade.431
Definitions of colonialism expressed by Oxford dictionaries lend credence to the exploitive
imposing means by which the expansion of European legal culture and legacies to non-European
states occurred. The Oxford Dictionary of Cultural Anthropology describes colonialism as “The
political, economic, and social domination of one society (colonizer) over another (colonized), to
the degree that the ways of life of the colonized are marginalized, disrupted, or eliminated by the
colonizer....”432

In describing the process by which colonialism materialized, the Oxford

Dictionary of African Politics states, “Colonial takeover in Africa relied on a combination of
coercion and co-optation and in most cases was sustained by high levels of repression and political
exclusion. Colonial regimes were also typically economically exploitative, focusing on the export
of raw materials with little investment in schools and healthcare.” 433
Although the definition of colonialism by the Oxford Dictionary of African Politics
unearths the exploitive measures utilized, some European states, individuals and groups beg to
differ. 434 Justifications for the imposition of colonialism include it being a civilization mission to
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enlighten states in the periphery of “the body of corporate nations.”435 Rather than describing
colonialism as a tool of imperial expansion, Pella defines colonialism as “a shared practice of an
international society’s member states wherein new subject-states are established in an area
previously outside the bounds of that international society for social and political reasons.”436 This
definition ignores all the atrocities that colonialism came with reflects colonialism as a regular
justifiable occurrence.
It has been asserted that European states were reluctant to engage in colonization as formal
civilization, and bringing Africans into the “commercial republic of the world” was deemed an
expensive venture.437 This assertion once again underplays the tactical planning that went into
colonialism by shrewd leaders. There were many processes involved in colonizing non-European
states, from the initial Geographical Conference by King Leopold to discuss the civilization of
Africa in 1879 to the convincing of the British to occupy the Congo area by Livingstone after his
exploration to the Berlin Conference that distributed Africa. 438
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In an attempt to characterize colonialism as an acceptable occurrence, the French
parliament, as recently as 2005, adopted a law that imposes the obligation to recognize the positive
contribution of colonialism. 439 In an effort to mask the true intention behind colonialism, the
French government asserts that it invested heavily into the infrastructure, health, and education
systems of French West Africa. 440 Although it has been argued multiple times that colonialism
was meant for good as it was costly to European states, Huillery engaged in an analysis to
determine the cost of colonialism to France, which serves as an example of the painstaking exercise
of colonialism. 441 The collection of data was gathered from colonial budgets from 1844 to 1957.442
The data included metropolis, federation, loan, auxiliary, and colony budgets. 443 According to this
analysis, French West Africa’s colonization took only 0.29 percent of French annual
expenditures. 444 This almost negligible contribution of colonial governments has been proposed
as the justification for colonialism, ignoring one of the most significant investments of
colonialism—the imposition of European legal culture.
The imposition of European legal culture did not occur by accident but through calculated
and deceitful means. Treaties signed during colonialism surrendered power, territory, and authority
to European states. 445 Territories that were colonized, although generally deemed nonsovereign
and uncivilized, were deemed sovereign for the purpose of treaties surrendering power. 446 Hence,
treaties signed with representatives of these colonized states were deemed lawful. 447 However,
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this ran contrary to international law, as these colonized states were not recognized as sovereign
and were not subjects of international law. 448 How then could European states lawfully acquire
these territories?449 Although many years after these treaties took place, the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties of 1969 entrenches treaties' long-standing principles.450 These principles
include pacta sunt servanda, good faith, and equal rights.451 According to positivist jurisprudence,
there was no involvement of sovereignty in colonialism, as there was no agreement between two
sovereign states but between a sovereign European state and a nonsovereign non-European state.452
The Masai of East Africa, for instance, claimed that they did not have sovereignty because
the British had full control over the criminal, civil, legislative, and judicial systems. On the other
hand, however, it was argued that the Masai were sovereign on behalf of the British crown. In the
same way, European states acknowledged Africans Kings as sovereign to conclude treaties. 453 By
European standards, African nations were deemed primitive, but loopholes were created in the law
when it benefited them, and non-sovereign territories were accorded sovereignty status to sign
treaties. 454 Once again, international law was used as a tool of diplomacy to rationalize actions
that did not comply with international law.
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Positivists reasoned that if international law was, in fact, law, the colonized people had no
credible capacity to conclude treaties. 455 European states ignored the fact that depriving these
states of actual sovereignty but occasionally granting this quasi-sovereignty in their favour was
antagonistic to the very nature of international law they created.456 Instead, the law was developed
and interpreted in any manner, even if contradictory, to suit their demands to impose on colonized
states, European law. 457
Apart from the mutually incompatible nature of the treaties imposed, many questions arise
based on European countries' actions that do not reflect international law principles. Parties to
these treaties allowing colonialism were initially ignorant of each others language, but treaties
were drafted in the language of the European states.458 Therefore, colonizing states had acted mala
fide in signing treaties where the other party did not understand the nature and effect of the
contract.459 Also missing in these treaties was the principle of pacta sunt servanda. If the
colonizing state did not want to be bound by the treaties due to its inconvenience, they simply
found it null and void. 460
Colonialism was established by Europeans for Europeans, and colonies were incorporated
via European law. 461 Before colonialism, European public international law was developed
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through shared borders, history, and religion and was used as the governing law for colonialism. 462
In essence, European states assumed a right to dominate the world, based on their legal order of
droit public de l’Europe or ius publicum europaeum.463 There was a further drastic evolution and
expansion of public international law through colonialism controlled by European states.464
As colonialism was funneled through the law, specifically European law, the law is
described by Chanock as being on the “cutting edge of colonialism….”465 Just as law was the
central driving force of civilization, modern international law, was without a doubt, strongly
implicated in the creation of contemporary African states, which principally occurred through
colonialism. 466 By 1949, there was an infiltration of European international law to three-fourths
of the world, causing a universalized spread of European public international law.467 The original
nomenclature also evolved to public international law, dropping the qualifying adjective
‘European’—signifying its universalized nature.468 Colonized territories were faced with colonial
law which was foreign to them. 469 This was rampant in Africa, where they were deemed unfit to
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rule themselves without European law. 470 Colonialism was the beginning of the etching of
European legal culture into the legal system of colonized states, including Africa, and specifically,
Ghana.
Steeped in influence spanning centuries, the great powers successfully halted the
suggestion of trusteeship at the 1945 San Francisco Conference and many other initiatives to end
colonialism. 471 The delegations at the San Francisco Conference sat on the fence between
“advancing the internationalization of imperial governance” and “refusing to take a definitive
stand on the colonial question altogether.”472 Due to the influence of these great powers, ending
colonialism was not a simple linear route. Measures based on the trusteeship system in Chapters
XII and XIII and all other non-self-governing territories in Chapter XI of the UN Charter and the
1960 Declaration on the Granting of Colonial Independence were constantly interrupted and
rejected.473

In response to measures proposed, colonial powers refused to implement

resolutions. 474 The Fourth Committee of the General Assembly deliberated the first eight
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trusteeship agreements, out of which the anti-colonialists proposed 229 amendments; the European
Powers, together as an alliance, accepted none of them. 475
Colonial representatives consistently fought each step of the way. They succeeded in
preventing the establishment of a permanent committee of colonial oversight. 476 Just as the eight
great powers during the Congress of Vienna decided that “the subject of the relations of civilized
states with backward peoples be determined by all the Powers collectively,” 477 European powers
continued to make collective decisions and defend colonialism. 478 This defense, capitalizing on
contradictions in U.N. policy, was that states under their formal empires were in a better position
than states living in independent territories.479
However, at the end of colonialism, which seemed to be the end of an imperialist era, there
was an entrenchment of European legal culture through decolonization.480 The widespread
dependence on European law, and the protracted entanglement with this law, caused states to be
decolonized by this law. 481 As decolonization declined, colonial territories, were now sovereign
states as recognized and developed by European law, allowing them to be full members of the
international society. 482 The move from European law to worldwide law was then solidified. 483
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International law, for centuries, had been a “legal monopoly.” 484 This legal monopoly was
controlled by states which established colonial regimes, including Great Britain, France, Portugal,
and Belgium—of which some were great powers.485 The new international order consisting of the
United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank (was then International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development) was controlled by great or big powers. 486 Through
the breakdown of colonial systems, many states became a part of these institutions as the
Europeans had access to many nations through colonialism. 487 There was a substantial
development of international law that ran parallel to and influenced colonialism and its
breakdown. 488
In hindsight, colonialism was a globalizing project, advancing the homogenization of legal
culture.489 A conduit of this legal homogenization was criminal law. Nine-tenths of the world
practices common or civil law, in which both have their histories tied to European civilization. 490
Civil law can be traced to Roman antiquity, where laws were written, codified, and imposed on
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the people. 491 Common law, prevalent in England was developed through the customs of the
people. 492 Although exclusive to the customs and legal culture of the British, common law was
imposed on colonized states, including African states, and was also transplanted by English
colonists who settled in the United States.493 Through the distinctly European penal code system,
there was an institutionalization of the criminal justice system. 494 The following section explains
selected international legal instruments against FGC and their emphasis on legislation, specifically
criminalization and sanctions against FGC.
Current International Law Mechanisms Against FGC
The protection of women from FGC by the international community has revolved mainly
around legislative measures. Due to the homogenization of legal culture over centuries,
international law has progressed towards criminalization and criminal responsibility more
recently, and this criminalization, as noted earlier, developed from European legal culture.495 The
international community advocates for the constitutional recognition of the rights of girls and
women. However, the focus is on criminal laws and the sanctions that come with these laws. 496
When it is stated that advancements have been made in international and domestic law, this
advancement is centered around criminalization and the normative enforcement mode.497
Research has proven that advancements have been made in Africa towards curbing FGC. 498 These
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advancements focus on the fact that 26 of the 29 states in Africa where FGC is practiced have laws
prohibiting the practice, with punitive sanctions attached. 499 These penalties are either in the form
of monetary fines or sentences ranging from three months to life in prison. 500 As discussed in the
previous section, African states have been deeply imbued in European law for centuries. As a
corollary of this European legal culture, merged with international law’s advocacy of
criminalization is the criminalization of FGC as the unparalleled solution.
The United Nations Population Fund has stated, “We know that a legal framework that
clearly outlaws FGM can support its abandonment. When a government criminalizes FGM, it
sends a clear signal that the practice will no longer be tolerated.”501 The criminalization of FGC
sends a clear message and shows that a state has taken measures to eradicate this practice.
However, criminalization has its limitations, which will be discussed in chapter five.
The move towards legislation, criminalization, and sanctions against FGC in international
law and agreements can be observed in the following:
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW)502
As the most extensive international legal instrument for women, CEDAW is often cited
as it seeks to end discrimination against women.503 Based on article 1 of CEDAW, two main
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requirements are necessary to qualify FGC under CEDAW. 504 Firstly, the discrimination must
be against women. Secondly, the distinction must be detrimental to the equal enjoyment of rights
by women.505
Article 1 - “For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "discrimination against
women" shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment
or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men
and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural, civil or any other field.”506
According to the definition in article one, FGC meets the test to be recognized under
CEDAW. Firstly, FGC is primarily performed on women, mostly young girls below the age of
fifteen who do not have the capacity to act.507 Secondly, FGC is detrimental to the equal enjoyment
of sexual rights by women as it is believed that as sex will be painful and undesirable, young girls
will have no desire to “break their virginity.”
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Considering this discrimination, CEDAW

recommends states take effective measures towards the eradication of discrimination. These
include:
Article (2) (b) - “To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including
sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women.”
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Article (2) (f) - It also requires states to “take all appropriate measures, including
legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices
which constitute discrimination against women.”
International law instruments on human rights that came into force prior to the international outroar
against FGC, such as CEDAW, do not specifically prohibit FGC practice. However, there have
been subsequent developments to address this gap, including:
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 14 deals specifically with FGC: 509
(a) That States parties take appropriate and effective measures with a view to eradicating
the practice of female circumcision. Such measures could include: The collection and
dissemination by universities, medical or nursing associations, national women’s
organizations or other bodies of basic data about such traditional practices; The support
of women’s organizations at the national and local levels working for the elimination
of female circumcision and other practices harmful to women; The encouragement of
politicians, professionals, religious and community leaders at all levels including the
media and the arts to cooperate in influencing attitudes towards the eradication of
female circumcision; The introduction of appropriate educational and training
programmes and seminars based on research findings about the problems arising from
female circumcision…”
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General recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating
General recommendation No. 19:510
29. The Committee recommends that States parties implement the following legislative
measures:
(a) Ensure that all forms of gender-based violence against women in all spheres, which
amount to a violation of their physical, sexual, or psychological integrity, are
criminalized and introduce, without delay, or strengthen, legal sanctions
commensurate with the gravity of the offence, as well as civil remedies.
30. The Committee recommends that States parties implement the following preventive
measures:
(a) Adopt and implement effective legislative and other appropriate preventive
measures to address the underlying causes of gender-based violence against women,
including patriarchal attitudes and stereotypes, inequality in the family and the neglect
or denial of women’s civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and to
promote the empowerment, agency and voices of women.
CEDAW primarily highlights legislation and sanctions in the elimination of FGC. Any
other measure that is applicable is encompassed under other measures or “take all appropriate
measures.”511 Further developments to CEDAW have highlighted some of these other measures
towards the eradication of FGC. However, General Recommendation 35, similarly to CEDAW’s
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main provisions, focuses primarily on legislation—criminalization and punitive measures against
FGC. This focus on legislation with sanctions reemphasizes criminalization as a measure second
to none. General Recommendation 14 highlights measures that could fit the social fabric of
communities practicing FGC. It is my suggestion that these measures be developed and merged
with legal measures in other recommendations and international legal instruments, rather than in
passing under the umbrella of other measures. As it has been recognized that culture is the primary
cause of FGC, remedies related to the said culture which influences the people should be explored.
This offers a viable solution as opposed to only normative criminalization measures that have not
been entirely successful in eradicating FGC.
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)512
The main purpose of the CRC revolves around the “best interests of the child.”513 FGC is
acknowledged as a practice that primarily affects children as it is disproportionately performed
on girls between infancy and the age of 15.514 Although FGC is not explicitly stated as the
primary focus of the convention, it was a focal point during discussions leading to the CRC's
finalization.515
Article 19 (1): States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social,
and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental.
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Committee on the Rights of the Child. General Comment No. 4 on Adolescent health and
development under the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 19 May-6 June 2003:
(39) …States parties must take all appropriate legislative, administrative and other
measures for the realization and monitoring of the rights of adolescents to health and
development as recognized in the Convention. To this end, States parties must notably
fulfil the following obligations: … (g) To protect adolescents from all harmful
traditional practices, such as early marriages, honour killings and female genital
mutilation.
Measures highlighted for the realization of the rights of children and adolescents include
legislative and social measures. However, the committee on the Rights of the Child, General
Comment 4, mainly highlighted legislative and administrative, and similarly to other international
instruments, captured all other measures under the umbrella of other measures. This diminishes
the value of social and cultural measures in the eradication of FGC and demonstrates the
progression towards legislative measures, and specifically criminalization by the international
community, which has not materially deterred the practice of FGC.
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT)516
The Convention against torture focuses on the right not to be subjected to torture, as the
title explains. The title of this convention has raised the issue of whether FGC is torture, as the
intent behind FGC is not torture but full acceptance into a society. 517 However, the United Nations

516

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December
1984, 1465, UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987) [CAT]
517
Camilla Yusuf & Tonatan Fessha, "Female Genital Mutilation as a Human Rights Issue: Examining the
Effectiveness of the Law against Female Genital Mutilation in Tanzania" (2013) 13:2 Afr Hum Rts LJ 356 at 367.

86

describes FGC as cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, which infers torture.518 Secondly, the
definition of CAT involves the consent or acquiescence of a public official. In this regard, the
inaction, lack of enforcement of laws, and sometimes, the total disregard by police officers to stop
people from practicing FGC shows that government officials have implicitly condoned the
practice. 519 Torture is defined in the convention as:
Article 1: [A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain
and suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Article 2 (1): Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial, or
other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.
Article 4 (1): Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its
criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by
any person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture.
(2) Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate penalties
which take into account their grave nature.
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The penalty in CAT against all torture is, again, criminal law. This demonstrates the pull
towards criminalization instigated by the international community. Specifically, focusing on FGC,
social factors may cause police officers to ignore persons practicing FGC. Kahan shows how police
rarely enforce harsh penalties against an accepted norm.520 Instead, he suggests “gentle nudges”
in changing a social norm.521 I hold vernacularization, which considers the social fabric of the
people as a measure qualifying under gentle nudges. FGC is not a quintessential example of crime
because of culture and intent, and hence, legal measures must consider these factors.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights522
The UDHR is not a convention but a codification of all human rights by the Geneva
Assembly. 523 Codified in 1948, it is the earliest comprehensive document outlining the rights of
a human being and is referred to as the “international bill of rights.”524 Therefore, all rights against
torture or related to health outlined in CEDAW, CRC, and CAT flow from the UDHR. Therefore,
FGC is under the scope of the UDHR.
Article 5: No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.
Article 15: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that "everyone has the
right to standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself.
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This chapter shows how European civilization, coupled with colonialism, was a tool for
perpetual sidelining and pseudo-equality. Decolonization, on the other hand, rather than causing
states to move away from a European legal system, solidified the position of European law as
international law. The widespread dependence on European international law caused states to be
decolonized by this law and retain it to continue to be members of an international community.
Modern international law has made efforts towards eradicating FGC. The main
consequence of the international agreements discussed in this chapter is enacting national
legislation to ban FGC in many states.525 However, as noted by Davar, “the force of custom
remains stronger than the force of law,”526 and therefore, legislation has not been effective in
totally eradicating the practice of FGC. International law occasionally refers to the term other
measures but merely parenthetically. These international instruments have not considered
intersectionality as they should. As FGC is caught at the intersection of ethnicity, race, and gender,
legal measures towards its eradication must focus on social and cultural factors that will influence
the people from these communities. More recently, the United Nations has started calling for
“culturally sensitive measures”
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that incorporate a social perspective. As there exists in

international human rights, missed opportunities for an intersectional approach, international
measures must place more focus on “culturally sensitive measures.” 528
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The following chapter demonstrates how European civilization, colonialism, and the pull
towards criminalization in the international community have been reflected in Ghana’s domestic
law.
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CHAPTER 4
Relics of Colonialism as a Tool of Assimilation
This chapter shows how due to colonization and the need to homogenize the legal culture
of the world, domestic law, rather than integrating international law according to the culture of
Ghana, has duplicated international and European law and legal culture. Colonialism has had a
long-lasting effect as there were cultural legacies arising from the European colonial expansion.529
Colonialism has been described as socio-legal experimentation as it veers beyond law and affects
society over time.530 As discussed in chapter three, the homogeneity of criminal law and procedure
in Africa is currently entrenched due to colonialism.
With over 412 million people under British rule at its zenith of influence, it is plausible
that the transplantation of European laws in territories caused the globalization of European law.531
There was a large-scale transfer of laws and legal institutions. 532 Codes of criminal law and
procedure, which found their origin in English law were introduced into British colonies, which
included Ghana.533 Through colonialism, there was a standard body of criminal law and procedure
in most places around the globe.534 Long-term consequences of the imposition and transplanting
of criminal legal systems continue to be revealed centuries later.535 As noted by Merry, “In Africa,
criminal law was very much a product of the imperial project.”536
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The legal system of Ghana, previously the Gold Coast, can be traced to 1821, when the
British Crown assumed territorial jurisdiction.537 The Bond of 1944 solidified this take over when
it was proclaimed that “the first objects of law are the protection of individuals and property.”538
It was agreed by the colonial office of the Gold Coast that substantive criminal law should be
English common law, the rules of equity, and the statutes of general application.539
One of the earliest traces of English criminalization in Ghana was the declaration that
customary practices such as human sacrifices, panyarring, or the kidnapping of hostages for debt
and other similar customs were barbarous and abominable and against the law. 540 The criminal
codes imposed in many territories, including Ghana, remain intact in domestic law to a high
degree.541
Even after independence, the modern Republic of Ghana was exposed to English law and
criminal law, which was an extension of the British imperial administration. 542 As of 1972, fifteen
years after independence, sources of Ghanaian law included received law.543 Received law
incorporated English common law, the doctrines of equity, and general application statutes passed
in England, which were in force on July 24, 1874.544 From 1983-1986, twenty-six to twenty-nine
years after independence, English common law and English doctrines of equity were still
embedded in Ghanaian law. 545 Undoubtedly, the foundation of criminal law and criminal
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procedure in Ghana is based on the essential concepts and principles of English criminal law and
criminal procedure.546

As a result of this foundation, even though there has been post-

independence legislation to cater to new situations, the Ghana Criminal Code of 1960547 can be
considered reformed versions of provisions under English law. 548
In 1962, based on the hierarchical ordering, the sources of law in Ghana were:
(a) The Constitution549
(b) enactments made by or under the authority of the Parliament established by the
Constitution,
(c) enactments other than the Constitution made by or under the authority of the
Constituent Assembly,
(d) enactments in force immediately before the coming into operation of the Constitution,
(e) the common law, and
(f) customary law. 550
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Over 30 years after the 1962 hierarchical ordering of the sources of law, there was no
significant change, signifying the entrenched nature of English common law. The constitution of
Ghana 1992 states:551
The laws of Ghana shall comprise—
(a) this Constitution.
(b) enactments made by or under the authority of the Parliament established by this
Constitution.
(c) any Orders, Rules, and Regulations made by any person or authority under a power
conferred by this Constitution.
(d) the existing law; and
(e) the common law.
The 1992 Constitution552 describes this common law as “the rules of law generally known
as the common law, the rules generally known as the doctrines of equity, and the rules of customary
law including those determined by the Supreme Court of Judicature.”553
The unequivocal acknowledgment of English law as a source of law was not exclusive to
the Constitution. Aprah noted in 1970 that the sources of statutory law in Ghana consisted of:
Statutory law in Ghana, as noted by Apreh (1970), comprises:
1. The received British statutes;
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2. British statutes and Orders in Council that were made to apply in these countries before
the attainment of independence;
3. Local enactments made by the Legislative Councils and Parliaments before
independence;
4. Post-independence legislation passed by the legislative bodies or constitutional organs
charged with legislative powers, including military councils. 554
The following section describes Ghana’s method of incorporation of international
conventions explained in chapter three into its domestic law.
The Incorporation of International Law into Domestic Law
A state is not bound to a treaty or convention until expressly acknowledging its consent to
be bound by “signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.”555 Ratification is described by Article
2 of the Vienna Convention as “the international act so named whereby a State establishes on the
international plane its consent to be bound by treaty”556 In Ghana, constitutional ratification of a
treaty requires a procedure of authorization from parliament.557

Article 75(2) of the 1992

Constitution requires Parliament to ratify treaties “executed by or under the authority of the
President.”558

Victor Essien “Sources of Law in Ghana” 246 at 252
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1963, 500 UNTS 95, art 11 (entered into force 27 January
1980)
556
Ibid at art 2.
557
Emmanuel Yaw Benneh, "The Sources of Public International Law and Their Applicability to the Domestic Law
in Ghana" (2013) 26 U Ghana LJ 67 at 70.
558
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992 art 75(2).
554
555

95

The Constitution of 1992559 acknowledges the role of international law in Article 40,
Chapter six, stating:
In its dealings with other nations, the Government shall(a) promote and protect the interests of Ghana;
(b) seek the establishment of a just and equitable international and social order;
(c) promote respect for international law, treaty obligations and the settlement of
international disputes by peaceful means;
(d) adhere to the principles enshrined in or as the case may be, the aims and ideals of(i) the Charter of the United Nations;
(ii) the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity;
(iii) the Commonwealth;
(iv) the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States; and
(v) any other international organisation of which Ghana is a member.
Also, according to Article 75, a dualist approach based on the balance of power between
the Executive and the Legislature as adopted from English law:560
1. The President may execute or cause to be executed treaties, agreements, and conventions
in the name of Ghana.
2. A treaty, agreement or convention executed by or under the authority of the President
shall be subject to ratification by
(a) Act of Parliament; or
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(b) A resolution of Parliament supported by the votes or more than one-half of all the
members of Parliament.
Based on these provisions, Ghana has ratified treaties related to FGC, Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) (CEDAW),561 Convention
Against Torture & Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) (CAT),562
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (CRC)563 explained in chapter three.
Ratifying and incorporating these conventions that emphasize criminalization, and
sanctions against practices such as FGC, causes states to focus on criminalization and sanctions as
the primary method of eradicating FGC. Ghana’s representatives presenting on progress made in
accordance with CEDAW noted that the Criminal Code of 1960 had been amended to criminalize
harmful practices, including FGC. 564 This submission offers a case in point regarding the ripple
effects of the focus on criminalization and sanctions as the unparalleled means of combatting FGC.
Additionally, Nana Oye Lithur, Minister for Gender, Children and Social Protection of Ghana,
presented the third to the fifth periodic report of Ghana on its application of the stipulations of the
CRC. 565 This presentation was made before the Committee on the Rights of the Child. 566 Ghana’s
efforts to eliminate FGC was once again highlighted as criminalization with a minimum

561

[CEDAW], supra note 503 art 1.
[CAT], supra note 517.
563
[CRC], supra note 513.
564
“CEDAW Statement Ghana” UN Women: United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of
Women, online (pdf)
<https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw36/statements/CEDAW%20STATEMENT%20Ghana.pdf>
565
“Committee on the Rights of the Child examines the report of Ghana” (21 May 2015) online: United Nations
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15987&LangID=E>
566
Ibid.
562

97

punishment of five years. 567 The Committee Experts praised Ghana for its legislative efforts, which
included criminalizing FGC.568
Although Ghana had noted its progress in criminalizing FGC and had been congratulated,
Committee Experts expressed concern about why the practice still ensues although progress had
been made. This is further evidence that criminalization is not sufficient in eradicating FGC. The
following section expands on Ghana’s criminalization of FGC.
The Normative Mode of Criminalization in Domestic Law
In Ghana, the laws drafted on FGC have been in force for twenty-seven (27 years)569, with
a few successful prosecutions.570 These measures fulfill the requirements of criminalization.
However, the limitations of criminalization, seemingly ameliorated by implementation, reflect the
force of culture. Even when criminalization has fully been fulfilled, it is not enough as the
normative mode of enforcement that is punitive through the courts is not a one-size-fits-all
measure. As noted by Webb, this traditional deterrence method “has not been and needs to be
sensitive to the different pressures to break the law and how these different pressures or norms
must be deterred in different ways.” 571 The prevalence in particular regions in the North, such as
the Bawku municipality, is still as high as 82%.572
Based on the criminal laws of Ghana and the laws regulating the assimilation of
international law, both based on English law, is Ghana’s criminalization of FGC. The Criminal
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Code Amendment Act 1994 inserted Section 69A to specifically illegalize FGC, among other
things, which modified the Criminal Code Act of 1960. The section reads:
(1) Whoever excises, infibulates, or otherwise mutilates the whole or any part of the labia
minora, labia majora, and the clitoris of another person commits an offense and shall
be guilty of a second-degree felony and liable on conviction to imprisonment of not
less than three years.
(2) For the purposes of this section "excise" means to remove the prepuce, the clitoris and
all or part of the labia minora; "infibulate" includes excision and the additional removal
of the labia majora. 573
In 2007, the Act was amended, increasing the minimum incarceration period if found guilty
by two years.
“Whoever carries out female genital mutilation and excises, infibulates or otherwise mutilates the
whole or any part of the labia minora, labia majora and the clitoris of another person commits
an offense, and is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than
five years and not more than ten years.” 574
The imposition of an increment in the period of incarceration as a sanction, not materially
deterring the practice of FGC, further acts as evidence that criminalization can only go so far in
ending a practice deemed to exude positivity in the eyes of the perpetrators. The reasoning behind
the two-year increase in the sentencing of a perpetrator of FGC is argued to be deterrence, albeit
other factors may be included. This benefit-cost theory of the economic model of the rational actor
is relied upon in the hopes that the severity of punishment may influence behavior if potential
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offenders weigh the consequences of their actions and conclude that the risk of five years in prison
is severe.575
Some policymakers and practitioners believe that an increase in the severity of
imprisonment enhances the “chastening” effect, which reduces the chances of committing another
offense.576 Nagin, Cullen, and Jonson in their review of the effect of imprisonment in offending,
prove that the length of a sentence has less of a bearing on deterrence.577 Although criminalization
and the traditional mode of enforcement, which is prosecution resulting in incarceration, have their
benefits, it cannot be solely relied on to eradicate the practice, as there appears to be a tenuous link
between people’s compliance and the risk associated with law-breaking behaviour.578 Ghana has
been imbued in western legal culture for centuries, along with significant developments in the law.
However, there are aspects of the social fabric of Ghanaians (FGC) that have not changed.579
Hence, the law needs to consider the social fabric in the implementation of legal measures.
In the following chapter, I focus on interpreting the constitution to determine if vernacularization
through incorporating customary norms is a workable option in eradicating FGC according to the
Constitution of Ghana.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion and Suggestions
Extensive Enforcement beyond the Normative Approach- Constitutional Mandate
and Allowance
As established in previous chapters, human rights and the majority of the law in Ghana and
many other countries are a Western construct.580 As the criminalization of FGC appropriates a
Western framework, I propose vernacularization as a tool in translating human rights instruments,
including conventions described in chapter three, into the social fabric of the people of Ghana. 581
The process of vernacularization localizes international measures and adapts these measures for
local implementation. 582 Vernacularization involves translating the law into a familiar framework
that resonates with the people and their way of life.583 To them, customs are the law. These
customs are law enough to disregard criminalization and still practice FGC. 584 As an intersectional
approach, vernacularization exists at the intersection of law and society’s social fabric.585
Vernacularization also originates from the feminist theory and considers the well-being of
women. 586 I propose that vernacularization is funneled through the unrefined customary law
practiced by communities practicing FGC. Considering this solution, I explore interpretations of
the constitutional mandate to determine if vernacularization is indeed a viable solution.
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In Ghana, the constitution does not expressly make mention of violence against women
and children or FGC. However, Article 15 makes mention of torture generally, emphasizing the
inviolability of dignity. 587 This can be read with Article 28(3), which prohibits cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment of children. However, particularly applicable to FGC, Article
26(2) states, “All customary practices which dehumanise or are injurious to the physical and
mental well-being of a person are prohibited.” Section 39(2) places the heavy onus on the State to
ensure that “…traditional practices which are injurious to the health and well-being of the person
are abolished.”588
In the case of Mami v. Paulina, which addressed the issue of the disinheritance of a woman
due to culture, the courts stated, among other things, that although the tradition was undoubtedly
against the well-being of the women in the Krobo area, the courts did not have the power to abolish
customs.589 The reason is that in Article 39(2) of the Constitution, the abolition of a customary act
may only be done via (i) Parliament, (ii) The President, and (iii) Those who practice the custom.590
In the case of FGC, there has already been an abolition by Parliament through section 69A of the
Criminal Code Amendment Act. The weighty onus placed on the State has been partially fulfilled
through criminalization and minimum enforcement. However, the constitution does not expressly
state the method through which these harmful practices may be eradicated.
In the quest to determine the meaning of a text in the constitution to determine the extent
of its provisions, rigorous arguments have circled literal versus purposive interpretation. Asare
cites Justice Date-Bah’s epitaph in Asare v Attorney General, “What interpretation is to be given

The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992 (Ghana) Article 15 states, “Article 15 states that ‘the dignity of
all persons shall be inviolable’ and that no person shall be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or any other condition that ‘detracts or is likely to detract from his dignity and worth as a human being’.
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the words should depend upon the court's perception of the purpose of the provision and the context
of the words, rather than on their dictionary meaning.”591 He cites it to prove that the purposive
approach used, as in the case of Asare v Attorney General could lead to absurdities and
incompatibility with the democratic state of affairs.592 He strongly expresses his sentiment, stating,
“Let us be ruled by the framers' expressed words, not their unexpressed intent.”593 Similarly,
Gyandoh, in his analysis of Bennion’s formal principles governing Ghana's republican
constitution, states, “…this determinate meaning is discoverable from the plain or ordinary
meaning of the words used.”594
Given the back-and-forth contention on the best mode of interpretation, and judges’
preference for the literal approach, this portion of the thesis looks through the lens of the literal
meaning of Article 39(1), read with Article 39(2). This is to ascertain if an approach that goes
beyond the standard process of criminalization and considers the archetype of the people is
legitimized by the Constitution. Considering the literal approach, the word abolish signifies putting
an end to, or completely doing away with, usually used officially. The origin of the word is to
destroy. 595

To completely do away with or destroy the act of FGC requires more than

criminalization. The Constitution is focused on the harm being done to people, and if the
criminalization of FGC and minimal prosecutions is not adequate, the onus remains on the State
to prevent harm.
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In expressing his stance, Gyandoh recommends that the totality of words be recognized,
“forming an organic whole,”596 while also noting the relevant features of the context, featuring
the Interpretation Act.597 In assessing the features of the context, The Interpretation Act indicates
as to statutory duties in Section 10, stating:
(1) Where an enactment confers a power or imposes a duty the power may be exercised,
and the duty shall be performed from time to time as occasion requires. (2) Where an
enactment confers a power, or imposes a duty, to do any act or thing all such powers
shall be deemed to be also given as are reasonably necessary to enable that act or thing
to be done or are incidental to the doing thereof. [As amended by the Interpretation
(Amendment) Act, 1961, (Act 92) s.3]598
The enactment in this context is the Constitution. Section 10 creates an invocation, whereby
duties are conferred when the occasion requires it. It is evident from the prevalence of FGC that
there is an activation of an occasion as there is a situation whereby people’s well-being and health
are being harmed, contrary to Article 39(2). Section 27 of the Interpretation Act further states that
the use of the word shall renders a provision imperative while may is permissive or empowering. 599
A reading of Section 10 with Section 27 of the Interpretation Act affirms the weighty onus
Article 39 places on the State. When the occasion requires it, “The State shall ensure that… and in
particular that traditional practices which are injurious to the health and well-being of the person
are abolished.” Shall is imperative, meaning that it is vitally mandatory to ensure that a practice
such as FGC comes to a halt. The Constitution does not state how abolition should be accomplished
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but places a duty on the State to abolish harmful cultural practices. Per section 10(2) of the
Interpretation Act, all powers necessary to fulfill the eradication task are conferred upon the State.
Therefore, the State can utilize culture as a means to abolish FGC, and as seen below, the State is
encouraged by the Constitution to use culture, when possible,
Although section 39(2) places the onus on the State to eradicate harmful cultural practices,
Article 39 (1) and (2) of the Constitution, which mainly focus on the customs and culture, states:
(1) ... The State shall take steps to encourage the integration of appropriate customary
values into the fabric of national life through formal and informal education and the
conscious introduction of cultural dimensions to relevant aspects of national planning.
(2) The State shall ensure that appropriate customary and cultural values are adapted and
developed as an integral part of the growing needs of the society as a whole...
(3) The State shall foster the development of Ghanaian languages and pride in Ghanaian
culture.600
Article 39(1), read in conjunction with Article 39(2) and (3), also places an onus on the
State to consciously introduce cultural dimensions to relevant aspects of national planning. What
better way than for culture to rectify culture? As noted previously, the people do not believe in
criminalization and are not deterred by it. However, as Davar states, the people have a love and
dedication for culture stronger than the force of law.601 According to the case of Mami v Paulina
stated above, the people who practice the custom have the power to abolish it. Acting with
traditional leaders to abolish this practice in their uncodified laws will have a ripple effect
downwards, as the custom is woven into their social fabric and is influenced by each others’
600
601
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perceptions. In addition, vernacularizing the law in educational and implementation measures, 602
expanding it beyond the urban, literate society creates more knowledge and access to justice for
girls in communities that practice FGC.
Customs, in integration with legislative measures, poses a viable solution. According to
Tyler and Darley, the authority should be legitimate in the people's eyes for the people to act
appropriately. 603 The law the people deem appropriate is their pure customary law conducted
through traditional leaders informed by customs they revere. Customary law merged with
legislative measures is an institutional design that reflects the social fabric of the community.
This design is hinged on creating eradication projects steeped in the community’s core values
and frameworks to encourage local interest, involvement, and volunteerism. Culture is
significant in a community; thus, legal measures against FGC programs must align with Ghana’s
constitutional mandate to ensure that suitable customary and cultural values are adapted as an
essential element of society’s needs. Local leaders and stakeholders possess legitimacy in their
community’s eyes as they are the gatekeepers to history, culture, customary law, values, and
growth. Therefore, they wield power to act as agents of receptivity for FGC policies. As Merry,
based on her observation of vernacularization processes, notes, “moreover, we found that the
social position of the messenger is key.”604
Although there may be difficulties implementing this vernacularized system, as with all
legal systems, if this process is successful, it will cause a ripple effect as the people hold their
customs in high regard.605 As criminalization with minimal prosecutions is not enough, the duty
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is on the State to find solutions based on the growing needs of the society. Through the reading
of the Constitution (the applicable sections), it is evident that the State may use implementation
measures such as vernacularization through customary law. Rather than being subsumed as an
ancillary measure, integrating unrefined customary law with existing legal mechanisms will
yield more significant results.
Conclusion
Dissimilarity in people, persona, and cultures is the world's status quo and has been
moulded into the truism of diversity. This dissimilarity in people is evident in the practice of
FGC, as those affected by it are at the intersection of race, gender, ethnicity, and class. Therefore,
feminist legal perspectives and TWAIL appraisals of the law must be considered. Given that this
diversity exists, there are key differences in ideologies that the law should account for while
improving the normative mode of legal enforcement. Diversity does not allow room for a perfect
correlation between deterrence and the criminal act, as many internalized variables come into
play, which in this case, is the cultural fabric of the people of Ghana.
Criminalization and the evolution of human rights are a step in the right direction as they
undoubtedly have their benefits. However, the current legislative measures in the international
and domestic law system stem from a Western framework. Ranging from Roman civilization to
the forceful assimilation of Ghanaian legal culture under European legal culture, developing
countries, including Ghana, have been thrust into legal pluralism. This thrust, as opposed to a
conscious progression towards legal pluralism, has caused a “fragmented and inconsistent”606
legal system as Merry describes it. The homogenization of legal culture is also based on Western
systems as they have evolved and spread over centuries. However, despite the seeping of
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Western law into the legal system of Ghana, the people of Ghana still hold their values and
customs in high esteem. Therefore, enforcement of the law against FGC must be tailored to
address the reasons for the crime, evident in the cultural and social fabric.
Criminalization is often used as a generic means of abolition, serving as an umbrella under
which FGC would find applicability. International instruments and domestic law against FGC can
be essentialist, mainly reflecting solutions based on a white, middle-class point of view.607 This
was the point of view reflected in the European legal system, which is the foundation of most laws.
Logical connections tie the abolition of FGC to extra measures of enforcement, including
vernacularization which involves an intersectional approach. It is not unreasonable to project that
the practice of FGC will continue to ensue if the international community and States continue to
charge forward in this narrow, myopic view of criminalization and normative enforcement. A
worthy evolution is born of necessity, and alternate modes of application involving
vernacularization would be beneficial in the quest for the total eradication of FGC.
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